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1 CHAPTERINTRODUCTION
n all countries some portion of economic activity
remains unobserved by the government
statistical agencies that measure Gross Domestic
Product (GDP).  This unobserved activity we call the
shadow economy and it is defined in this report as
the economic output that should be included in the
national accounts, according to SNA-93 definitions, but
that remains unrecorded (UN 1993). Previous
research has identified two sources of the shadow
economy (OECD 2002). The first, the statistical
shadow, arises from issues related to data gathering
and data compilation practices, and the second, the
economic shadow, arises from the motivations of
firms, households, and individuals who prefer to
remain unobserved.  The statistical shadow will arise,
for example, when incomplete sampling frames are
used for surveys or censuses so that some segments
of the population are omitted from the data, or when
procedural issues related to survey non-response are
incorrectly handled, or more generally when
limitations in capacity yield inadequate data collection
or analysis.
The economic shadow is associated with the
decisions of firms or households who misreport their
activity in order to avoid observation. Those in the
economic shadow may benefit materially, by evading
tax or social insurance obligations, or by ignoring the
requirements of costly regulations. Participation in the
economic shadow will involve tradeoffs for these
actors however, since there are also costs associated
with shadow participation. These costs include
potential penalties for non-compliance, as well as the
possibility of reduced access to both public and private
goods, such as pensions, police protection, and
financing. Understanding how firms view these
tradeoffs is fundamental to understanding the shadow
economy’s effect on the well-being of participants and
its significance for the overall economy.
In addition to its economic and statistical sources,
the shadow economy can be divided according to
whether it is associated with formal or informal
activity6. While the informal sector has been defined
in numerous ways, often to accommodate local
conditions, the distinction between the formal and
informal need not lead to confusion in the
measurement and study of the shadow economy. In
this document we distinguish the sectors according
to legal registry requirements so that informal sector
shadow measurement can be made with precision7.
As a result of this distinction quite different
methodologies are required to study these sectors,
and they will have very different characteristics. Since
statistical tools are better developed in the formal
sector, the formal sector shadow is likely to be
associated primarily with economic causes and may
be more responsive to policy changes.  The informal
sector presents the dual challenge of a less developed
statistical infrastructure and economic motivations for
remaining unobserved.
There is evidence that the informal sector
shadow economy is particularly important in
economies in transition from socialism to capitalism
(Eilat and Zinnes 2002).  The restructuring that occurs
as government support of state run enterprises is
eliminated typically displaces a large number of
workers.  In addition, institutions that support market
functioning are often operating poorly at the outset of
a transition.  In this setting, the informal sector shadow
economy can play several roles, perhaps most
prominently as an employer of last resort, in which
displaced workers can forestall poverty. The ease of
entry in the informal sector shadow can also be a boon
to workers with few assets, but who may be educated
or otherwise skilled. Thus, despite the negative
connotations of the economic shadow, its dynamism
can lead it to play an important role harnessing
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6 A third category of activity that remains mostly unobserved is the output of illegal goods (OECD 2002). In this report we do not
address illegal outputs but will discuss illegal behaviors associated with noncompliance.
7 We recognize however that there are distinctions regarding types of enterprises within the informal sector that are often framed as
degrees of formality. Examples include having paid labor versus only unpaid family labor, or differences in permanence of business
location. In Mongolia an important distinction arises across enterprises with regard to their compliance with the Informal Sector Law.
These degrees of formality are discussed further in Section 5 of this report.
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entrepreneurial energy, buffering formal sector
shocks, and serving as an incubator for small business.
Despite its potential benefits, particularly in the
short-run, the effect of participating in the informal
sector shadow can be a net negative in the long-run.
Lack of access to capital markets and finance can distort
investment and hiring decisions so that output is less
capital intensive and horizons of shorter duration than
would be optimal. These constraints can make it
impossible for organizations to capitalize on
economies of scale, leading to reductions in productive
efficiency. Further, participation in the informal sector
shadow may lead to changes in attitudes and social
norms regarding the desirability of participating in the
formal sector. As a result shadow participation in the
informal sector may have enduring effects due to
changes in the attitudes and capacities of participants
as embodied in their physical, human, and social
capital. Thus while formal firms may move into or out
of the economic shadow relatively easily based on
their perception of economic consequences,
participation in the informal sector shadow may be
more enduring, suggesting that policies to reduce
participation in the informal sector shadow economy
may be more difficult to implement.
The potential for enduring or hysteretic change
is but one of several difficulties the informal sector
shadow presents for policy-makers.  Perhaps the
most straightforward difficulty is the loss of tax
revenue due to evasion, by both formal and informal
participants, that limits the ability of government to
pursue welfare enhancing policies and provide public
goods.  The low quality of public goods can result in a
vicious cycle if firms enter the informal sector shadow
when they do not receive fair value from their tax
payments, thus further eroding tax receipts. The
existence of the shadow also creates informational
problems for decision makers. Since the true size and
structure of the economy is not known, the allocation
of resources across sectors and regions is likely to be
inefficient. Further, at the level of the macro-economy,
policy decisions regarding monetary and fiscal
stimulus often depend on GDP and its growth rates.
Inaccurate information on these variables implies that
policies cannot be created with confidence and their
effects are uncertain8.
The complex issues associated with the
measurement of the size, the causes, and the
economic and social consequences of the informal
sector shadow economy in Mongolia, and their policy
implications are the subject of this report.  The source
of data on which conclusions are based was a
collaborative project among the Open Society Forum
of Mongolia (OSF), the National Statistical Office of
Mongolia (NSO), the IRIS Center of the University of
Maryland (IRIS) and the Economic Policy Reform and
Competitiveness Project (EPRC) of the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID). The
main project activity was the implementation of a
survey of 19,000 households in all regions of
Mongolia, which took place in October and November
2004.  Data on the financial status, and institutional
environments of formal and informal enterprises was
gathered as well as information on personal and
household characteristics for these groups and for
wage earners.  Note that while data was collected on
formal sector firms that appeared in the sample, the
project was not designed to measure the size of the
formal sector shadow economy.
The structure of the report is as follows. The
present section introduces the scope and goals of the
study, and the methodological approaches
implemented to achieve them. Section 2 provides
detailed discussion of the survey instrument and
details of the methodological issues associated with
the treatment design. Because the methodologies
adopted in the final survey were novel in the
Mongolian context, they required extensive pre-
testing.  Section 2.1 discusses the motivations for and
the results of the two pretest exercises and an
explanation of how the results affected the final
methodological approach.  Section 2.2 introduces the
organization of the final survey instrument including
details on the question types, question content, and
on the use of variants of the survey instrument to
create experimental treatments. Selecting a cost-
effective yet representative sample for the informal
sector survey presented some interesting challenges.
Section 3 discusses how these issues were
addressed, with sub-sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3
addressing respectively, sample size, sample selection,
and the methodology of extrapolating of survey
results to the broader population. Section 4 presents
the core results on the measurement of the size of
the informal sector shadow economy, and considers
the results of the experimental treatments on informal
sector shadow economy measurement. Section 5
analyzes the policy implications of the informal sector
8 Additional discussion of the policy relevant issues raised by the shadow economy is found in Eilat and Zinnes (2002).
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survey. Sub-section 5.1 extends the measurement of
shadow size in Section 4 by developing a picture of
the shadow economy based on descriptive statistics
of both formal and informal sector activity. Sub-
sections 5.2 and 5.3 extend the descriptive analysis
to examine the causes and consequences of informal
sector shadow participation. Section 6 begins by
summarizing the conclusions and policy implications
of the study. It then identifies a number of weaknesses
in the implementation of the instruments and analysis
and then proposes low-cost refinements to overcome
them. The section concludes by suggesting a number
of follow-on activities that would help ensure the
practicality of future informal sector surveys as well
as extend this work to address other large parts of
Mongolia’s unmeasured shadow economy.
The primary activity of the collaborative project
was the implementation of the informal sector
household survey (ISHS). The ISHS was intended to
increase the accuracy of the NSO’s GDP
measurement by providing a new baseline for current
and future estimates of the informal sector’s
contribution to Mongolia’s economic output.  In this
capacity the results of the ISHS replace those from
survey conducted by USAID/EPSP in 1999 (Bikales
et al. 2000). As a tool suitable for the measurement of
GDP the ISHS addressed both the statistical and
economic sources of the informal sector shadow
economy. To address the statistical sources of the
informal sector shadow economy the ISHS
implemented a modification of the mixed household-
enterprise survey in the Mongolian context. The
mixed survey represents a research strategy that UN
argues is “the most suitable approach” for collecting
data on the informal sector as a whole (UN 2000; vol
1)9. The chief advantage of this approach is the
relatively complete sampling frame derived from the
listing of households, and as will be discussed in
Section 2, this household frame was deemed
preferable to a sampling frame based on the Informal
Sector Law10.  One difficulty with the mixed survey
approach was identified as a result of previous work
in Mongolia including the recently concluded Labor
Force Survey (LFS).  The LFS results indicated that
only a small share of households would be of interest
due to the large number that did not participate in the
informal sector activity. To address this issue the UN
recommends a two-stage sampling process,
identifying informal businesses in a brief initial
interview and then returning to a sample of the
business owners. Because this process would have
proved prohibitively expensive and time consuming
a single-stage modification was adopted that included
the immediate dismissal of a large number of
households without informal sector participation so
that sample size requirements could be achieved at a
reasonable cost. The implications of this dismissal
protocol for the analysis are discussed in Section 3.3
and in Section 6.2 which discusses potential
refinements.
The design of the ISHS also incorporated a
number of techniques to address the economic
sources of the informal sector shadow. Previous
research in survey design has focused on how to
reduce non-response, particularly to questions
associated with income and other sensitive issues.
Some of the findings suggest that quite simple
measures can be effective in encouraging responses.
Simple reminders about legal confidentiality
requirements and the use of statements that
encourage cooperation by reminding people of the
importance of the data gathering processes have been
shown to be effective (Moore et al. 2001). Additional
methods aimed at insuring respondents that their
anonymity was respected included the use of sealed
envelopes so enumerator would not know the
respondents answers, and the use of scrambled
responses, that added statistical noise to individual’s
answers while allowing the aggregate results to
remain interpretable. Notice that these two methods
insure against two different respondent concerns.
Using a sealed envelope insures the respondent
against embarrassment that may arise from verbal
admission to enumerators. The response is
completely observable to the analyst however. The
addition of statistical noise preserved anonymity more
completely, since even the analyst was unaware of
each individual’s true response. Aggregate behaviors,
however, remain interpretable. The procedures used
to offer anonymity are discussed in more detail in
Section 2.2 and their statistical properties are
elaborated in Appendix 1.
9 Our adaptation of the household-enterprise survey design has the advantage of also yielding data on formal sector participants and
being less costly than the design suggested by U.N. researchers. Some caveats regarding our approach are included in Section 6 of
this report.
10 The Informal Sector Law applied to only a subset of activities in the informal sector shadow, and the pretest results indicated that
even among these sectors there was significant non-compliance with registration requirements.
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In addition to the measurement of the informal
sector shadow’s contribution to GDP at the national
level, measures of size are developed within five
regions, the West, Khangai, Central, East, and
Ulaanbaatar, and within three locations, aimag center,
soum center, and rural area. These measurement
units provide comparability with other data collected
by the NSO including the Household Income and
Expenditure Survey (HHIES), and the LFS. Estimates
of contributions to value added by sectors are also
included, with the measurement at the level of
aggregation of the single digit International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC).
In addition to its measurement goals, the ISHS
survey includes questions that identify the causes and
social consequences of the informal sector shadow
by measuring key aspects of the institutional setting
in which the economic agents make their decision to
participate in the formal or informal sector. Tax
compliance, the prevalence of “pressure” from
government agents and the frequency of bribery or
11 A related question that is explored is the extent to which the informal sector complements or substitutes for formal activity. As a
complement to the formal sector, informal sector firms might serve as subcontractors, supplying inputs to production processes beyond
their sophistication or capitalization. As a substitute to the formal sector we would expect to see direct competition with formal sector
firms.
“gift-giving” is elicited, as are experiences and beliefs
associated with governmental public goods such as
the quality of the judiciary and the effect of regulatory
regimes on profits. Experiences with private sector
institutions such as financial intermediaries and
business associations are also elicited.  These
questions allow us to understand the extent to which
the sector retains its character as an employer of last
resort, functioning primarily to alleviate poverty, or if
other more dynamic entrepreneurial enterprises are
forming, allowing the accumulation of wealth.11 Finally,
we analyze the consequences of the informal sector
on attitudes regarding tax and regulatory “morality,”
to understand how informal institutions, such as norms
of behavior related to bribery, tax evasion, smuggling
and other activities interact with formal institutions.
As a result of these inquiries we can draw conclusions
on policy alternatives, and identifying those that may
have positive, negative, or no effect on the well-being
of Mongolian citizens.  A summary of these results is
found in Section 6.1.
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n this chapter we provide details on the content of
the survey instrument, which was developed af
ter two pretest exercises, conducted in April and June
of 2004.  The pretests were critical to the design of
the final instrument since several of the survey
techniques under consideration were experimental
and the feasibility of using them in the larger survey
needed to be assessed. In order to provide a clear
understanding of how the final design was chosen,
and to provide adequate information for those who
may consider using these tools in future surveys, we
begin our discussion of the survey design by
discussing the pretests and the conclusions we drew
from these exercises.
2.1 SETTING THE STAGE: STEP 1 AND STEP 2
PRETESTS
Step 1 of the pretest was a data collection exercise in
Ulaanbaatar conducted on the weekend of April 13th
and 14 th of 2004, by a team of twenty NSO
enumerators.  A random sample of 240 households
was selected and data was successfully collected from
them all. There were several goals in the first step of
the pretest. First, it was important to understand how
important anonymity was to respondents. Since the
measures to protect anonymity are costly it would
not have made sense to use them if they did not reveal
any additional sensitive information. Although the
techniques have proven effective elsewhere for
measurement of the informal sector (Sivasan 2003),
it was necessary to test their effectiveness in the
Mongolian context. A secondary question that, to our
best knowledge, has not been studied elsewhere is
the extent to which the need for anonymity varied
across individuals with different personality
characteristics associated with trust and risk. The
investigation of social and personal attitudes is not
only a methodological concern, however. We were
also interested in learning, in the pretest and across
Survey instrument
the course of the project, the extent to which
measured characteristics are associated with shadow
participation, household income, and other behaviors.
The pretest also served the useful function of training
a core team of experienced NSO enumerators in the
new techniques. Many of this group would take on
supervisory roles in the final survey. Their experience
in Step 1 was instrumental in implementing
modifications in Step 2 and in the final survey.
Step 1 of the pretest consisted of three
treatments with each varying in an aspect of the
respondent anonymity protocol. Respondents were
randomly assigned to one of the three treatments.
The main difference across treatments was the
amount of statistical noise introduced into questions
which required dichotomous (yes or no) responses
to questions of varying degrees of sensitivity12. The
introduction of noise in two of the treatments is known
as a randomized response protocol and was originally
introduced by Warner (1965).13 Treatment 1 did not
use the randomized response protocol but asked for
the respondent to reply directly to the sensitive
questions as is typical in surveys. The responses for
Treatment 1 were sealed in an envelope, however,
providing protection against embarrassment to the
enumerator. Treatments 2 and 3 introduced protection
for the respondent by including an additional non-
sensitive or innocuous question and the respondent
would answer either the sensitive or innocuous
question based on the result of a die roll that was
observable only to them. In Treatment 2 the
respondent had a 75 percent chance of being asked
to respond to the sensitive question. Treatment 3
provided additional protection for respondents since
the probability of being asked to respond to sensitive
question was reduced to 50 percent. As a result, in
the randomized response treatments, neither the
enumerator nor the survey analyst knew the response
with precision.
12 Section 2.2  below details the question protocol for the “two-question method” that was used in this pretest and in the final survey.
Appendix 1 presents statistical properties of the randomized response protocol.
13 See also Chaudhuri and Mukherjee (1983), which contains a thorough discussion of a large number of randomized response
techniques.
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In addition to testing the randomized response
protocol for dichotomous questions, the instrument
for Step 1 included an experimental protocol for the
elicitation of risk attitudes and questions on trusting
behavior. The risk elicitation allowed respondents to
choose among a number of different types of lotteries
with cash payments, and the nature of their choices
indicated the risk attitude14. The responses to these
questions are of both substantive and methodological
interest.
Step 1 of the pretest produced several important
results that followed through to the final survey.  First,
with regard to the design of the “two-question”
method, providing an intermediate level of protection
in Treatment 2 generally yielded results very close to
the less costly treatment 1 for the most sensitive
questions.  For example, with regard to the question
“Did you register and pay the patente (informal sector
tax) last month?”, 80 percent, 78 percent, and 44
percent responded “yes” in Treatments 1, 2, and 3
respectively.  As a result, in Step 2 and in the final
survey, treatments similar to Treatment 1, the least
costly, and Treatment 3, the most informative, were
used.
The pretest results also emphasized the fact
that when designing the randomized response
protocol the choice of the innocuous question has an
important impact on the successful implementation
of the method. The proportion answering “yes” to
the innocuous question should not differ too greatly
from the proportion answering “yes” to the sensitive
question in order to give respondents security. Small
differences between these two proportions are also
necessary for the method to be computationally
meaningful15.  The design of the question pairings
was aided by testing the questions on the team of
enumerators before the Step 1 pretest was fielded. A
further finding, consistent with what has been
discovered previously in the literature, was that the
two-question method was not well suited to generating
responses to numeric questions (Eichorn and Hayre
1983). Given the large number of numeric questions
associated with the measurement of the informal
sector shadow economy, the multiplier method, also
discussed in Appendix 1, was tested in Step 2 and
applied in the final survey.
With regard to the elicitation of attitudes towards
risk and trust, we found that these characteristics were
important both methodologically and substantively.
With regard to substantive issues, we found that high
trustors, defined as those scoring above the median
score on three trust questions, were much less likely
to have participated in bribing government officials.
Risk aversion had a similar effect although the
magnitude of the difference was much smaller.
Methodologically, those exhibiting high levels of trust
exhibited less variation in responses across the
treatments.
Step 2 of the pretest extended the project in
three important ways. First, the geographical scope
was wider, with visits to aimag and soum centers and
a small number of rural households along with
additional enumeration in Ulaanbaatar. The addition
of soums and outlying rural areas was deemed an
essential part of the project in preliminary discussions
with NSO principals, so that more valid measures of
the size of the informal sector shadow economy would
be obtained. To accommodate the geographical
expansion the sample size for Step 2 was increased
to 600. Table 2.1 presents the sample size for each
location.  Step 2 of the pretest survey was conducted
from June 14th to June 18th 2004.
14 In both Steps 1 and 2 of the pretest the respondent’s compensation was tied to random outcomes associated with the risk game. This
protocol was not used in the final survey since a very small payment to the respondent was possible, and the survey length was such
that the possibility of such a small payment was inappropriate.
15 It is possible to generate a negative value from the computation if questions are poorly constructed. Appendix 1 discusses this in
detail. Negative estimates of proportions occurred for one question in Step 1 but did not occur in Step 2 or in the final survey.
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The second extension in Step 2 was to
investigate alternative approaches to collecting
information on value added of the self-employed
businesses. Two types of income and balance sheets
were developed, a short form which captured
information relevant for value added in only five
questions, and a long form which included extensive
subcategories for different items contributing to value
added. For example, with regard to expenses, the
short form contained one question and the long form
ten questions for distinct categories of expenses.  It
was not clear in advance if the complexity of the
businesses justified such an extensive enumeration.
Three treatments were implemented to determine
the proper approach. Treatment 1 implemented the
long form of the income and balance sheet with direct
questions. Treatment 2 implemented the short form
with direct questions and treatment 3 the short form
with the randomized response protocols for both
sensitive questions and numeric responses. Both
Treatments 1 and 2, with direct questions, required
that responses be sealed in envelopes. As a result of
enumerator feedback from Step 1, refinements were
made to two-question instructions, the risk elicitation
and the business description section of the survey.
Due to the importance of social attitudes in
understanding responses, this section of the survey
was expanded for Step 216.
The critical result from Step 2 was associated
with the design of the income and balance sheet
section. The results showed that the short form would
lead to substantially higher estimates of the size of
the informal sector shadow economy, overstating the
size by 50 percent if treatment 1 is taken as a baseline.
The higher estimates of shadow size resulted from
dramatically lower expenses in the short form. It
appears that the listing of expenses served to remind
people of costs that would otherwise have been
ignored17.
Step 2 of the pretest also led to a major
restructuring of the survey format to insure that
enumerators identified the proper respondents and
their status in the formal or informal sector of the
economy immediately.  This insured that the personal
characteristics elicited were for the relevant business
owner as often as possible. This change also allowed
for the introduction of a cost-saving protocol in the
ISHS in which the interviews of a substantial portion
of formal sector wage earners, who were a low priority
for this survey, were ended immediately.  The details
of the final survey design used in the ISHS are the
subject of the next section of the report.
As a final note, in spite of their small sample
sizes the pretests provided evidence to suggest that
income in Mongolia is not normally distributed. This
is consistent with what is found in other countries and
across time.18 This means that standard methods of
hypothesis testing and sampling generally need to
be modified. This carries important implications for
the estimates developed in Section 4 and is discussed
therein; we also return to this issue in Section 6.2.
TABLE 2.1  Distribution of sample in Step 2 pretest
16 All survey instruments are included in Volume II of the report.
17 The main effect of the long form was on expenses because firms had many categories of expenses but only a small number of sources
of income.
18 While there is some disagreement as to the appropriate distribution, principal candidates are the Pareto and Lognormal distributions.
See Cramer (1971; p. 46) for details.
Aimag center Soum Center Rural Area Urban District
Dornogovi Zamin Uud  n=100
Khovsgol Murun  n=143 Khatgal  n=60 Alagardene  n=17
Selenge Mandal  n=120
Ulaanbaatar Bayanzurkh  n=160
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2.2 SURVEY DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION
The pretest work led to the development of a survey
instrument for the ISHS that contained thirteen
sections that can be segregated into five areas that
include 1) identifying whether the household
participated in the informal sector, 2) collecting basic
demographic data as well as attitudes related to
personal and social preferences such as trust,
trustworthiness, and risk, 3) describing the business
activity which, for both formal and informal sector
owners, included a detailed income and balance sheet,
4) identifying attitudes, behaviors, and perceptions
associated with the institutional setting in which
business was conducted, and 5) generating feedback
on the survey process. A more detailed look at the
thirteen survey sections is presented in Table 2.2
which identifies the purpose of each section and
clarifies who responds and what question types are
used. Note that the question types will vary across
treatments so that not all respondents will see all the
question types. For example sections 8 and 10 include
one or both of the randomized response questions
identified here as Q for the two-question method and
M for the multiplier method.  Some respondents,
however, received either direct questions (D) or direct
questions with sealed envelope responses (E) in these
sections. Note that methods Q and M also made use
of the sealed envelope response method, except for
a small test sample (Treatment 4) which responded
to the M questions verbally. A detailed discussion of
the treatment types, below, is associated with
Table 2.3.
The different question types were designed to
provide different levels of protection to the
respondents. In developing the survey, we
hypothesized that there are two primary reasons a
respondent may want to preserve anonymity. In a face
to face interaction a respondent may be reluctant to
admit non-compliant behavior to the enumerator.
Alternatively, the respondent may be primarily
concerned about exposure of information to
government officials at higher levels where
enforcement may be a concern. These concerns may,
of course, vary over question content, and we develop
treatments that incorporate protection from one, both,
or none of these concerns in order to gather
information needed to further improve this
methodology. Details of the question types follow.
• Direct (D) questions are standard survey ques-
tions which serve as baseline for our analysis of
treatment effects. Respondents give a verbal
reply and both the enumerator and the analyst
know the actual response.
• Envelope (E) questions replies are written by
the respondent and placed in an envelope and
so are never observed by the enumerator.
These responses are known by the analyst and
so can be used in an analysis just as direct sur-
vey questions are used.
• Multiplier (M) questions use a randomizing de-
vice to introduce noise into the response and
are used on questions eliciting a numerical re-
sponse. The multiplier question was applied to
the income and balance sheet questions. The
technique asks respondents to multiply their
true value by a number that results from the roll
of a die, with the roll of the die hidden from the
enumerator.  With the multiplier question nei-
ther the enumerator nor the analyst knows the
true response with certainty, thus preserving
privacy. Population averages of the response
are derived based on the statistical properties
of the multiplier. There are two multiplier for-
mats. For MD the respondent reports the multi-
plied response verbally to the enumerator. For
ME the multiplier result is sealed in an enve-
lope. Appendix 1 contains additional details on
this protocol.
• The Two-Question (Q) question style is used
for sensitive dichotomous “yes/no” questions
in the institutional setting section. With this ap-
proach, respondents randomly answer either
the sensitive question or an innocuous question
such as “Can you play a musical instrument?”
We implement the Q questions with a 50 per-
cent probability of the respondent being asked
the sensitive question.  As in the multiplier
method, the die roll that determines the rel-
evant question is concealed from the enumera-
tor.  After the die roll the answers are recorded
and sealed in an envelope at the completion of
the survey section. Appendix 1 contains addi-
tional details on this protocol.
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Section
1. Introduction &
Cover Sheet
2. Sorting
3. Socioeconomic
Background
4. Social Attitudes
5. Risk Attitudes
6. Innocuous Questions
7. Activity Description
8. Income and
Balance Sheet
8a. Sector specific
Questions
9. Sensitive Questions
(Low)
10. Sensitive
Questions (High)
11. Respondent
Feedback
12. Respondent
Earnings
13. Enumerator
Feedback
Purpose
Introduce enumerator and
survey purpose.
Determine self-employ-
ment status, sort to
question type or dismiss
from survey.
Analysis of behavioral
responses to economic
policy.
Analysis of behavioral
responses to economic
policy.
Analysis of behavioral
responses to economic
policy
Determine the sample
replies for the “Two
Question” method.
Determine nature of
business activity.
Financial data on primary
self-employment activity.
Additional detail on gold
mining, tourism, and
cashmere industry.
Questions on business
registry, tax, and policy
issues
Questions on bribery,
smuggling, tax compliance,
household income
Comprehension and
evaluation of instrument by
respondent.
Payment of participant and
departure.
Evaluation of participant and
completion of record-
keeping.
Who Responds
All
All
All remaining after dismissal
All remaining after dismissal
All remaining after dismissal
Treatments 1, 2, & 4
(Those not receiving two
question method in section
10.)
All employed. (Self-
employed receive greater
detail.)
Self-employed.
Those in the specified
sectors
Self-employed.
All employed. (Self-
employed receive greater
detail.)
All remaining after dismissal
All remaining after dismissal
All remaining after dismissal
Question Type
D
D
D
D, E
D
D
D
D, E, M
D, E, M
D, E
D, E, Q, M
D, E
D
D
TABLE 2.2  Survey sections
D = Direct, E = Envelope, M = Multiplier, Q = Two Question. See Section 8, below, for detailed explanation.
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TABLE 2.3 Treatments and question types
Treatment Numeric Dichotomous Sample Size
1 Direct Direct 300
2 Envelope Envelope 2301
3 Envelope Two-question 2001
4 Multiplier (MD) Envelope 300
5 Multiplier (ME) Two-question 8998
Combining the data from different treatments
also allows us to generate high quality measures of
informal sector shadow activity while retaining the
flexibility to conduct policy analyses which require us
to link responses to sensitive questions to respondent
characteristics. This type of policy analysis would not
be possible if only the multiplier and two-question
types were used.
19 The sample size by treatment in Table 2.3 is the figure remaining after the dismissals of 5,111 respondents (wage earners and
unemployed) who did not contribute to measurement of the informal sector shadow economy. Some wage earners and unemployed were
retained, however, in order to make comparative analyses. The dismissal protocol and its implication for sampling weights is discussed
in Section 3.
We combined the question types into five
treatments as shown in Table 2.3 below19.  The
treatments are identified by a two-letter description
indicating the type of question used for the income
and balance sheet and the type of question used for
the sensitive questions on behavior.  Treatment 1
(DD) serves as a no-privacy baseline with all
responses made directly and verbally to the
enumerator. Treatment 2 (EE) provides protection
of privacy against the enumerator since the
respondent places responses to sensitive questions
directly in an envelope.  Treatment 3 (EQ) provides
additional privacy for the dichotomous sensitive
questions. Treatment 4 (MDE) incorporates the direct
response version of the multiplier questions.
Treatment 5 (MEE) provides the maximum amount
of privacy for respondents with all sensitive questions
protected by a die roll and the answers sealed from
enumerator view.
While our primary interest in developing the
survey treatments is to understand the effectiveness
of the different methods of preserving respondent
anonymity, survey treatments are also appropriate in
this study because of the flexibility in analyses that
they permit.  Because the randomized response
yields aggregate values without linking responses
directly to individuals it often outperforms direct
questions for measurement of population values.
Randomized response approaches are less useful
however for some policy analyses, such as those in
which individual behavior must be linked to the
institutional environment.  Thus the different
treatments offer the opportunity to take advantage of
different question types for different types of analyses,
thereby balancing the constraints of precision, privacy
protection, and sample size.
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n this section we provide details of the procedures
through which the sample for the Informal Sec
tor Household Survey (ISHS) was selected. The goal
of the sampling plan is to ensure a sufficient number
and distribution of household observations so as to
be able to provide estimates of value added (i) for the
five regions in Mongolia, (ii) at the national level by
rural and urban locations, and (iii) for a small number
of specific sectors.
To generate the size and distribution of the
sample, we make use of income data from the
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HHIES)
published in the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, self-
employment shares at the regional level from Labor
Force Survey (LFS) of 2002-2003, the current list of
patente holders at the soum level made available by
the Ministry of Finance, the household sampling
frame from 2002, and data from Step 2 of the pretest
of the ISHS in June 2004.
One of the key issues addressed in the design
of the ISHS was that a large number of households in
any sample chosen from the household list are
unlikely to be active in the small-scale shadow
economy. We address this issue through the survey
protocol by ensuring the rapid dismissal of most non-
shadow-economy participants. The sampling plan also
addresses this issue by generating selection
probabilities that depend on estimates of the
distribution of shadow activity based on the data in
the Ministry of Finance’s patente registry. A simple
average of the number of individuals registered under
the Informal Sector Law (patente holders) and the
number of households is used as the relevant
measure of size at the aimag and soum level. As
discussed below, the dismissal protocol was extended
so that the sample size could be expanded at minimal
cost, and an adequate number of informal sector
businesses be contacted.
The sampling plan was intended to assure an ex
ante precision of plus or minus 5 percent for the non-
herding informal sector shadow size.20 However, the
appropriate sample size to achieve survey results with
this level of precision depends on the variance of the
underlying value added of the informal sector firms.
The HHIES data, as published in the Monthly
Statistical Bulletin, contain only the mean household
incomes by location, not the variance. Unfortunately,
variances of the HHIES income measure were not
available. Without this information, we had to rely on
our own estimates of variances based on data from
other countries and on rules of thumb. This introduced
considerable uncertainty regarding just how precise
the results of the survey would be. To the extent our
variance estimates were smaller than the true values
then more imprecise results will obtain. If our
estimates were larger we will achieve additional
precision, although the survey would arguably be
more costly than necessary.
3.1 DETERMINING SAMPLE SIZE
Data was collected in the five regions of West, Khangai,
Central, East, and Ulaanbaatar and in four locations:
urban aimag center, urban Ulaanbaatar, soum center,
and rural. Note that due to the way the NSO records
information, Ulaanbaatar is both a “region” and a
“location.” A map of these areas is provided in
Appendix 2.
Both the HHIES results and ISHS pretest data
were used to independently develop estimates of
sample size. The two approaches were in fairly close
agreement for soum centers and aimag centers but
diverged for rural areas and Ulaanbaatar. Due to the
small sample size in the ISHS pretest—particularly in
rural areas—we chose to adopt the results calculated
from the HHIES data. Since the HHIES data is
reported at the location level only, however, it was
necessary to supplement this information to reflect
regional variation.  Regional variation in self-
employment activity was captured with the LFS data.
The use of this supplementary data resulted in the
Sampling
I
20 As discussed elsewhere in this report, the normality assumption underlying this estimate was not satisfied in the survey data. We
return to this concern in Section 6.2
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sample being distributed unequally across the regions.
The distribution of the sample across the four
locations is also derived from the LFS data and
checked against the data from the ISHS pretest (on
the contact rates with households with self-
employment).
The LFS estimates of self-employment
activity have a major impact on the structure of the
sample due to the large amount of variability in self-
employment activity that they reveal. A relatively large
sample is needed in Ulaanbaatar in part because only
22 percent of employment is self-employment in the
capital city. In contrast, the LFS reports self-
employment between 55 percent and 78 percent of
total employment in the other regions. The large
variation in regional rates arises primarily from the
differences in the urban-rural mix of the regions. Self-
employment rates in rural areas are close to 95 percent
according to LFS figures, while self-employment rates
in the aimag centers are similar to, though somewhat
greater than, those in Ulaanbaatar. We also assume
that variance of income is smaller in the rural areas
since there is more homogeneity of business type,
primarily that associated with animal herding. Both
the self-employment figures and the expected
differences in variance of incomes lead the sample to
be heavily weighted to aimag centers and Ulaanbaatar.
Our formula for determining the sample size
needed in a particular region and location is given by
with i=1,..,5 and j=1,..4 representing regions and
locations, respectively. The z
ij
 represent the raw
sample size calculation based on our estimated
variances of income and includes a finite-population
correction. I  is an inflation factor which addresses
the noise incorporated by the random-response
multiplier method and is equal to 1.3.21 The c
ij
 are the
rates of contact with self-employed households. We
use c
ij 
between 0.32 and 0.37 in urban areas, between
0.6 and 0.7 in the soum centers, and 0.89 in rural areas,
with variability in the figures associated with the LFS
results. Except in rural areas these numbers are larger
than the self-employment rates in the LFS data. The
numbers are inflated to reflect the fact that there are
many households with more than one worker. About
half way through the enumeration it became apparent
that households with informal sector businesses were
being found at a slower rate than anticipated. As a
result, reserve units were sampled and the dismissal
protocol was used so that survey resources were
focused only on those with informal sector
businesses.  Table 3.1 displays the resulting sample
across regions and locations.
ij
ijij cIzn
1**=
TABLE 3.1  Sample size and distribution
1. West - 1,632 479 198 2,309 0.12 0.08 0.17
2. Khangai - 2,910 520 265 3,695 0.20 0.16 0.23
3. Central - 2,324 733 364 3,421 0.18 0.23 0.19
4. East - 964 272 99 1,335 0.07 0.05 0.09
5. Ulaanbaatar 8,251 - - - 8,251 0.43 0.47 0.30
Total 8,251 7,830 2,004 926 19,011 1.00 1.00 1.00
    Location         Distribution by Region
Ulaan-Baatar                                                           Total
Share of
Patente
Share of
Sample
Share of
HouseholdsRegion
 Aimag
Center
Soum
Center
21 In other words, the multiplier requires a 30-percent larger sample size than a direct question. Of course, we believe the direct
question method results in biased estimates.
Rural
Area
3.2 SELECTION OF SAMPLE
The primary sampling units are the aimags in the
regions and the districts in Ulaanbaatar. Within aimags,
the aimag centers, soum centers and rural areas are
sampled in the amounts given in Table 3.1  The
selection of aimags and soums and of districts in
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TABLE 3.2  Aimag selection by region
Region 1: West
Aimag Aimag code Number of Obs. Selection Prob. Selected
Bayan-Olgii 2  0  0.29 0
Govi-Altai 5 0 0.16 0
Khovd 16 0  0.11 0
Uvs 15 1000 0.21 1
Zavkhan 9 1000 0.23 1
Region 2: Khangai
Aimag Aimag code Number of Obs. Selection Prob. Selected
Arkhnagai 1 1000 0.17 1
Bayankhongor 3 0 0.13 0
Bulgan 4 0 0.12 0
Khovsgol 17 1000 0.15 1
Orkhon 21 1000 0.27 1
Ovorkhangai 10 0 0.17 0
Region 3: Central
Aimag Aimag code Number of Obs. Selection Prob. Selected
Darkhan-Uul 19 0 0.28 0
Dornogovi 6 933 0.20 1
Dundgovi  8 0 0.07 0
Ulaanbaatar is presented below. The final selection of
households was done in the field after consulting
updated household lists. There was some variation in
how this was done. In Ulaanbaatar, systematic
sampling was done across each district. In some
aimags specific bags were selected with a probability
proportional to size methodology before systematic
sampling of the selected bags. When feasible
geographically, systematic sampling across bags was
conducted to reduce the concentration of
observations in a bag.
Aimag selection
Each of the five regions is sampled with probability
one. Within a region the number of aimags selected
depends on the overall sample size as reported in
Table 2.3. A total of nine aimags are selected: two in
the West, three each in the Khangai and in the Central
region, and one in the East. The selection probability
for each aimag is the average of the share of patente
holders and the number of households. The regions
and aimags selected are presented in Table 3.2 along
with their probability of selection and the proportion
of households in the aimag.
Aimags within a region are selected by drawing
a random number that is associated with the selection
probability after it is transformed to a cumulative
probability within a region. To see how this works, let
us use the probabilities from Region 1 in Table 3.2 as
an example. Here the cumulative probability method
would select Bayan-Olgii if the random number drawn
were between 0 and 0.29 and would select Govi Altai
if the random number drawn were greater than 0.29
but not greater than 0.45 (that is, 029 + 0.16). The
cumulative probabilities and the randomization device
for choosing among aimags are provided in an
attached Excel spreadsheet. Selections are made
without replacement when there is more than one
aimag to be selected in a region.
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Soum selection
Within aimags we select respondent households from
aimag centers, soums, and rural areas. Aimag centers
are included in the sample with probability one and
three additional soums are selected according to the
PPS method with weights as described for the aimag
selection. Table 3.3 presents the randomly selected
soums for all regions. Outside of aimag centers the
TABLE 3.3  Soum selection by region
probability weights for soums was the average of
household and patente weights. The probability
weight for aimag centers is always 1.00, conditional
on the aimag being selected. For the selected soums,
Table 3.3 also includes the total number of
households, the size of the sample, and the selection
probabilities.
Region = 1, aimag = Uvs
Selection
Soum Name  Sum Code HH Total Observations probability
Khovd 16 651 100 .0465958
Tes 15 1485 100 .1122324
Tsagaankhairkhan 18 763 100 .0728422
Ulaangom 19 5910 700 1
Region = 1, aimag = Zavkhan
Selection
Soum Name Sum Code HH Total Observations probability
Tosontsenge 4 2073 133 .2403779
Ider 7 823 122 .0387218
Tsetsen-Uul 20 564 121 .0407083
Uliastai 18 4117 932 1
Region = 2, aimag = Arkhangai
Soum Name mean(sum_cde) mean(hhtotal) mean(obs) mean(s_prob)
Erdenebulgan 18  4150 700 1
Erdenemandal 6 1725 100 .1034546
Khashaat 13 1028 100 .0423621
Ulziit 11 986 100 .0388192
Govisumber 22 0 0.03 0
Omnogovi 11 933 0.09 1
Selenge 13  0 0.18 0
Tov 14 934 0.16 1
Region 4: East
Aimag Aimag code Number of Obs. Selection Prob. Selected
Dornod 7       0 0.30 0
Khentii 18       0 0.29 0
Sukhbaatar 12 1000 0.40 1
TABLE 3.2 continued
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Region = 2, aimag = Khovsgol
Selection
Soum Name Sum Code HH Total Observations probability
Murun 22 7919 955 1
Renchinlkhumbe 9 1068 121 .0440513
Tarialan 10 1457 123 .0792718
Tsetserleg 18 1272 125 .0608465
Region = 2, aimag = Orkhon
Selection
Soum Name Sum Code HH Total Observations probability
Bayan-Undur 1 18322 1265 1
Jargalant 2 821 106 .668911
Region = 3, aimag = Dornogovi
Selection
Soum Name Sum Code HH Total Observations probability
Airag 1 881 100 .1021206
Erdene 12 660 100 .0638731
Sainshand 13 4552 634 1
Zamiin-Uud 14 1703 100 .3965035
Region = 3, aimag = Omnogovi
Selection
Soum Name Sum Code HH Total Observations probability
Dalanzadgad 15 3417 830 1
Khanbogd 10 585 117 .1503803
Khankhongor 11 741 147 .1017098
Nomgon 7 755 142 Z.1025376
Region = 3, aimag = Tov
Selection
Soum Name Sum Code HH Total Observations probability
ALtanbulag 1 822 135 .0389175
Erdenesant 26 1425 123 .0588547
Zaamar 17 1389 133 .0898976
Zuunmod 27 3301 861 1
Region = 4, aimag = Sukhbaatar
Selection
Soum Name Sum Code HH Total Observations probability
Baruun-Urt 13 3444 864 1
Erdenetsagaan 11 1339 122 .1217302
Menkhkhaan 4 1096 120 .1205302
Uulbayan 9 880 129 .0857333
TABLE 3.3 continued
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Ulaanbaatar selection
In Ulaanbaatar we select districts and with the same
probability proportional to size methodology used in
the outlying areas. The total of 5,100 observations is
selected from six of the nine districts with 850
observations in each district. Systematic sampling over
the updated household lists was implemented across
the districts.
TABLE 3.4  Ulaanbaatar District selection
 Sum name Households  Observations Prob. Weight Selected
Bagakhangai 700 0 0.01 0
Baganuur 5.476 0 0.03 0
Bayanngol 31.393 1.356 0.15 1
Bayanzurkh 35.682 1.388 0.19 1
Chingeltei 26.285 1.362 0.22 1
Khan-Uul 16.368 1.399 0.08 1
Nalaikh 5.469 0 0.02 0
Songinokhairkhan 35.208 1.384 0.17 1
Sukhbaatar 24.614 1.362 0.15 1
3.3 EXTRAPOLATION OF SAMPLE TO POPULA-
TION
The data collected in the Informal Sector Household
Survey (ISHS) is used to generate national and
regional estimates of the size of small-scale shadow
activity, as well as estimates in urban and rural areas.
The selection probabilities discussed in the previous
section are essential in making the extrapolation to
population totals. In fact it is the inverse of the
probability of household being selected that
represents the weight of that observation in the
population total. As we will see below the weight is
equivalent to the number of households that the
observation represents in the population as a whole.
The design approach
The underlying principle in the design method is the
random selection of households for inclusion in the
survey sample. This procedure leads to unbiased
estimates of population values and their variances
when all the households have a known, non-zero,
probability of being selected. As a result of the
randomization process the population values can be
reported with known precision without imposing any
additional assumptions.
The critical information for extrapolating from
sample to population values are the selection
probabilities. The inverse of the selection probability
for a given unit in the sample yields a weight that can
be thought of as the number of households that the
unit represents. Selection probabilities and weights
for the ISHS are given according to the following
formulas.
The primary sampling units in the ISHS are the
aimags which are selected at random from within each
region with their probability proportional to size. The
probability of aimag j  being selected in region i is
given by
i
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 is a measure of the size of the aimag and k
i
 the
number of aimags selected in a region, which varies
from 1 to 3 as shown in Table 3.2, and J the number of
aimags in the region. The measure of size chosen for
the ISHS is the average of the proportion of
households and proportion of registered patente
holders in a selection unit.  This measure of size is
used to gain efficiency in survey implementation by
increasing the probability of sampling in areas where
informal activity is believed to be high. The size of an
aimag, therefore, is given by
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where h and r represent the number of households
and registered patente holders in the relevant
geographic areas.
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Within aimags the aimag center is selected with
probability 1. Their probability of selection is therefore
P
ij, 
 the same as the probability of selecting aimag j.
Outlying soums are selected with the same probability
proportional to size methodology as the aimag so that
their probability of selection is
ij
ijk
ijijijk n
n
kPP =
which represents the probability of the soum being
selected conditional on aimag selection.  The number
of soums selected, k
ij 
,
 
is 3 except for Orkhon which is
a compact (urban) aimag for which no outlying soums
are selected.
Final selection probabilities for baghs and
households depend on the number of baghs that are
identified as being in the rural strata in each soum and
on the number of households in the updated
household listing. Two selection methods were used
at the bagh and household level. Rural baghs were
chosen either with probability proportional to size,
where size is the number of households in the bagh
as found in the updated household listing available to
the enumerating team at the beginning of the
enumeration. Following bagh selection, systematic
sampling was carried out to obtain the prescribed
number of households for enumeration. The alternate
method was to use systematic sampling across the
baghs, when distances between baghs were not large.
An initial sample of 100 observations were planned
for each soum. Sixty-seven of the observa­tions are
in the soum centers and 33 in the rural areas in six of
the nine aimags. Additional sampling was heaviest in
Ulaanbaatar, where informal activity was least dense.
Probability adjustments
Several adjustments to the selection probabilities are
necessary in order to draw appropriate conclusions
about population parameters. The need for adjustment
arises both by design and through the need to make
adjustments for non-sampling error. The adjustments
that were expected, due to the survey design, are
associated with the dismissal protocol implemented
to reduce total costs. Since information is gathered
from only a portion of those with wage income and no
recent history of self-employment experience, the
weights of wage-earners retained in the survey need
to be adjusted to yield correct figures for this
population, adjusting for the dismissed group. During
the ISHS, the initial sample consisted of 3,818
households that were wage-earners and 1,496 (39.18
percent) were dismissed immediately, while 2,322
were retained for further questioning. As a result the
weight of each of the 2,322 households must be
increased  by approximately   64.1322,2
818,3 =    since
we know each of these households must represent
roughly 1.64 households in the total sample22.
In addition to the dismissals, probability
adjustments were made for survey and item non-
response. After dismissing the 1,496 households, an
additional 170 failed to complete the survey. In addition,
there was a limited amount of non-response to specific
questions. Survey weights were expanded so that the
remaining households represented the population as
a whole. The assumption underlying the technique
applied assumes that the households not responding
are not, as a group, different from those that do
respond to the survey.
After these adjustments were made in
accordance with the original survey design, weight
adjustments were made to address the new sample
size. Since all the dismissals in the secondary sample
were either wage earners or unemployed, the
responses of these groups in the original sample were
expanded assuming that the two groups were
represented in the same proportions as in the original
sample. .
A final adjustment to probability weights was
made to address the issues associated with the
comparison of treatments. To make treatment
comparisons for population means and totals with
survey weights it was necessary to expand the weights
so that each treatment represented the entire
population. This rescaling was achieved by multiplying
the weights in each treatment by  5,...,1,011,19 =t
N t
,
where tN  is the number of observations in
treatment t.
22 In fact, because of the varying weights assigned to households, and slight differences in the average weights across the retained and
dismissed subjects, a more accurate figure of 1.59 is used for statistics reported on the wage-earning group.
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The value added from informal and
shadow activity
4.1 METHODOLOGY OF CALCULATION
The measurement of the size of the shadow economy
is one of the primary goals of the ISHS. In this section
we report on estimates of the size of the informal
sector shadow at the national, regional, and location
level, as well as estimates for a small number of sectors
as identified by the one digit ISIC. Additional results
on the characteristics of the shadow economy are
found in Section 5.1. Our approach to measuring the
gross value added of the informal sector shadow
economy is consistent with the production approach
to national income accounting as detailed in the
System of National Accounts (SNA) developed by the
UN and applied by the NSO (UN 1993; NSO 2000).
Our data collection goals were informed by UN
research on measurement requirements for the
informal sector (Becker 2000). Prior to
implementation the questions were reviewed and
approved by the methodology board of the NSO.
To calculate gross value added, questions on
revenues (rev), starting and ending inventories of
salable goods (invg) and of productive inputs (invin),
as well as expenses (exp), were asked of all who
reported self-employment income in the month of
September. Respondents were instructed to include
the value of their own consumption of business output
along with revenues. In order to achieve the most
complete enumeration of costs, respondents were
asked for values in seven categories. These included
materials purchased (1) for production and (2) for
resale, (3) the cost of fuel and electricity, (4) rents
paid for buildings, machinery and vehicles, (5)
transportation costs, (6) professional services, and (7)
other costs. Gross value added (gval_add) for each
business unit for the month was calculated as
       gval_add = output – intermediate consumption
       = rev + invg – exp + invin     (4.1)
where output = rev + invg  and intermediate
consumption = exp-invin.  The annualized gross value
added figures are reported in the tables below.
To generate the annualized figures on the size
of the informal sector shadow economy seasonal
adjustments were made to the responses for the
month of September, 2004. To convert the monthly
figures, the respondents were asked to directly
compare current month results to those in other
seasons (q110). For those with a positive gross value
added in September, seasonal adjustments were made
based on these responses. A subset of the sample,
roughly 25 percent of those with current self-
employment income reported that their gross value
added for September was less than or equal to zero.
For this group extrapolating the monthly result was
not feasible, and so an indirect method was used to
generate estimates for those reporting negative gross
value added. We also applied the indirect method,
described in detail below, to a second group of
business reporting extremely high value-added,
which we term the upper-tail group23.  These
businesses were flagged because not only was their
gross value-added large, but it was inconsistent with
two other measures collected to provide a check on
the gross value added figures from the income and
balance sheet. The first measure was the annual
income derived from the household income question.
The second measure is the reported business income
for the month, which was asked independently from
the components of gross value added.
For the bulk of the respondents, the values
from these three sources of data tracked very well.
For example the average ratio of business income to
gross value added for those with positive value added
but not in the upper tail was approximately 1.10.
Similarly, the ratio of value added to average monthly
household income was roughly 1.18. We feel that
given the different data generating processes (annual
versus monthly) that these ratios are reasonably close
23 The upper-tail group was responsible for the highly non-normal distribution of the value added in the survey.
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a result which suggests that the procedure for
generating annual gross value added worked
reasonably well.  The observations in the upper tail of
gross value added showed a different pattern, with
the identical ratios at levels of .31 and 7.2 respectively.
These results indicate that value added was
disproportionately large and unadjusted would have
led to an overstatement of the size of the informal
sector shadow economy.
Adjustments to the upper tail and to those with
negative gross value added were carried out by using
an OLS regression to generate predicted values of
gross value added for these two groups. This was
done by estimating the relationship between the
income derived from the gross value added statement
and monthly business income as reported in q111.
Results of the OLS estimation for Treatment E and
Treatment M are below. Note that a herder “dummy”
variable was used since the relationship between the
two measures of income was significantly different
across the herders and all other sectors. The monthly
income measure q111 was chosen as the most suitable
independent variable due to the lack of aggregation
and extrapolation it incorporated.  In addition, a term
interacting the income measure and the herding
dummy was included, since not only the intercept but
the slope of the regression differed for the herding
sector. The dependent variable, inc_new is the income
variable derived from the gross value added and is
defined as rev-exp-comp , where comp  is
compensation for employees, excluding the business
owner.
TABLE 4.1 Regression to adjust negative September value added and outliers, by treatment
Envelope Treatment
Source SS df MS Number of obs =    1365
F(  3,  1361) =  115.70
Model 1.8917e+13      3 6.3057e+12 Prob > F      =  0.0000
Residual 7.4177e+13 1361 5.4502e+10 R-squared     =  0.2032
Adj R-squared =  0.2014
Total 9.3094e+13 1364 6.8251e+10 Root MSE   =  2.3e+05
inc_new | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|             [95% Conf. Interval]
_Iherder1 -119717.2 21361.66 -5.60 0.000 -161622.6 -77811.88
q111m .3180646 .0222857 14.27 0.000 .2743467 .3617826
_IherXq111~1 .6154829 .0819067 7.51 0.000 .4548058 .77616
_cons 140085.9 7898.873 17.73 0.000 124590.6 155581.2
Multiplier Treatment
Source SS df MS Number of obs =    2749
F(  3,  2745) =   74.78
Model 8.8647e+12       3 2.9549e+12 Prob > F      =  0.0000
Residual 1.0847e+14 2745 3.9514e+10 R-squared     =  0.0756
Adj R-squared =  0.0745
Total 1.1733e+14 2748 4.2697e+10 Root MSE  =  2.0e+05
inc_new Coef.  Std. Err. t P>|t|             [95% Conf. Interval]
_Iherder_1 -98952.58 12658.83 -7.82 0.000 -123774.4 -74130.78
q111m  .1149619 .0109455 10.50 0.000 .0934996  .1364242
_IherXq111~1 .4823337  .0634559 7.60 0.000 .3579075 .6067598
_cons 132212.2 4334.041 30.51 0.000 123713.9 140710.5
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  All variables in the regressions for both
treatments are significant and the pattern across
treatments shows some consistency, giving us more
confidence in the results. We observe that the
coefficient on the herding sector dummy variable is
highly negative in both treatments. This result
indicates that herders are reporting lower measures
of business income as derived from the gross value
added protocol, after controlling for the reported level
of business income in q111. The slope term for the
herding sector arising from the interaction of q111
and the herder dummy is larger however than for
the other sectors. Thus the herder’s understatement
in the income and balance relative to their q111
responses diminishes as q111 increases.
After using the regression results to generate
the predicted value for income for those out of the
regression sample, the compensation and inventory
changes were added to inc_new to generate the gross
value added for the upper tail and for those with
negative gross value added. The original survey
responses were used for those respondents in the
middle group on which the estimation was conducted.
The monthly numbers were then annualized using
q110 which identified seasonal variation in earnings.
A final adjustment was made to account for those
households with secondary self-employment income.
Of the 7484 households that completed income and
balance sheets, 10 percent (748) also reported the
existence of an additional self-employment business.
For these secondary firms, complete income balance
sheet data was not collected. Instead estimates of the
value added were developed based on the share of
household income associated with that business. On
average, the secondary firms in a household, when
they existed, were one-third the size of the primary
firms. Since 10 percent of the households reported
secondary firms, the value added was approximately
0.10*33 = 3.3 percent of the value added by the
primary firms. In the next section we present the
results of these calculations.
4.2 SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE INFORMAL
SECTOR SHADOW ECONOMY
We present two sets of figures for all of our results,
one for the envelope Treatments 2 and 3, which we
group together and one for Treatment 5 which used
the multiplier method. In the tables and the text these
are referred to as Treatment E and Treatment M,
respectively.  In both Treatment E and Treatment M
the respondent recorded their income and balance
sheet responses on an answer sheet which was sealed
in an envelope before being returned to the
enumerator. In the multiplier treatments, the
responses were scrambled as described in Section
2.2 before being sealed in the envelope.
Results on the informal sector shadow size
presented in this section include aggregate national
totals as well as a breakdown of the annualized
measures by employment status, where employment
status distinguishes the informal herders from all
other self-employed business owners in the informal
sector. Figures are reported at the national level as
well as at regional and location levels, and by top level
ISIC. To get a sense of the relative size of the activity
uncovered in the ISHS, we report three ratios. The
first compares the NSO estimate of the size of the
herding sector in 2004, compiled from their annual
census of herds, with that based on the economic
values found in the ISHS. It is presented as
Herd Ratio
NSO
ISHS
Herd
Herd=
Also informative is the share of non-herding
activity as a share of overall activity, net of estimates
of informal activity already incorporated in the GDP
figures as a result of the early survey conducted by
Bikales et al. (1999) The non-herding informal (NH)
ratio is given by
Informal Ratio
BIK
ISHS
InformalGDP
InformalNH
-
=
Finally we present a ratio that expresses the
total additional value added observed in the ISHS as a
share of that observed by the NSO. The additional
value added (AVA) ratio is given by
Additional
Value
Added Ratiî GDP
HerdInformalInformal NSOBikISHS --
=
where the InformalISHS includes all informal sectors.
Three numbers generated by the NSO are used
to create these ratios. The first is the overall estimate
of GDP for 2004. The NSO’s preliminary estimate of
GDP is 1,807 billion togrogs24.  At the time of the
24 In constant (1995) prices this represents growth from 2003 of 10.4 percent.
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analysis the NSO had not yet estimated the share of
this figure that was associated with the Bikales
estimates of the informal sector shadow. As a result
we estimate the InformalBik figure using previous
estimates of the Bikales values and total GDP for 2000
to 2003.   InformalBik has risen from 11.37 percent in
2000 to 13.73 percent in 2003 according to the NSO’s
results. An ordinary least squares regression of the
time trend yields an estimate of the informal sector
shadow economy that can be applied to the current
NSO GDP estimates. This process yields a figure of
14.34 percent for 2004. Thus the baseline informal
sector GDP of Mongolia is given by
0.1434*GDP=259 billion togrogs           (4.2)
The NSO’s estimate of the herding sector is
approximately 18.27 percent of the total GDP for 2004
or 330 billion togrogs.
Table 4.2 shows that the mean estimate of the
share of the shadow economy derived from the ISHS
survey depends on the treatment with the mean value
equal to 766 billion togrogs in Treatment E and 584
billion togrogs in Treatment M. The non-herding
informal sector comprises roughly 63 percent (60
percent) for Treatment M (Treatment E).
TABLE 4.2 National informal sector gross value added (billions of togrogs) by treatment
Envelope treatment
Total  Subpop. Estimate Std. Err.             [95% Conf. Interval] Deff
informal 462658 36713.69 390661.4 534656.1  .8170159
inf_herd 302916 58317.46 188553.1 417280 5.918508
Total 765575 67974.99 632272.9 898877.6 2.204294
Multiplier treatment
Total  Subpop. Estimate Std. Err.              [95% Conf. Interval] Deff
informal 368776 61792.17  247633.9 489920 5.471972
inf_herd 214723 26795.97 162190.4 267257 3.874433
Total 583500 67089.85 451971.5 715029.7 5.308699
At the national level, the three ratios on shadow
activity are presented in Table 4.3.  In Treatment E,
the ISHS measure of the herding sector, at 303 billion
togrogs, is roughly 92 percent of the the NSO’s figure.
As in most sectors, Treatment M revealed a smaller
amount of value added, 215 billion togrogs, equivalent
to 65 percent of the NSO’s estimate. The informal,
non-herding, shadow size is estimated to be 30 percent
and 24 percent of the observed GDP, respectively, in
Treatment E and M, after excluding the InformalBik
values from the NSO estimates. This, we think is a
very relevant statistic for estimating the size of the
informal sector since it essentially serves as a
replacement of the Bikales number. Note that the
mean estimates are larger than those extrapolated
from the Bikales survey, estimated at 14 percent for
2004, with the additional activity arising from both
the coverage of additional sectors and apparent
growth relative to GDP in some important sectors.
The sectoral distribution of value-added will be
discussed in greater detail below in reference to
Table 4.6.
The final ratio presented in Table 4.3 is the AVA
ratio which measures the additional value added
captured by the ISHS survey as a share of the newly
estimated GDP. As shown in the previous tables and
the previous ratios Treatment E reveals an additional
9.7 percent of  economic activity while Treatment M
suggests it is unchanged. As will be discussed below,
the sectoral distribution of activity has changed
dramatically, and the AVA ratio, relative to the NSO
estimates, is based on a smaller herding sector and a
larger non-herding informal sector.
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TABLE 4.3  Share of shadow activity in GDP
 Treatment Herd Ratio Shadow AVA Ratio
Envelope  .9171901 .2987361 .0973704
Multiplier  .6501542 .2381171 -.0033354
TABLE 4.4  Regional estimates of shadow value added (billions of togrogs)
Envelope treatment regional estimates
Total  Subpop. Estimate Std. Err.                 [95% Conf. Interval] Deff
West informal 67613.01 10656.59 46714.91 88511.11 .5082051
West inf_herd 64036.89 17538.14 29643.72 98430.06 2.261788
Khangai informal 72989.94 10143.54 53097.96 92881.92 .5949976
Khangai inf_herd 109675.1 50571.5 10501.9 208848.4 7.955758
Central informal 80732.64 21466.64 38635.5 122829.8 2.432345
Central inf_herd 87708.94 22584.53 43419.55 131998.3 4.460202
East informal 13243.54 5258.843 2930.688 23556.39 .8178075
East inf_herd 33991.43 7153.453 19963.16 48019.71 2.126052
Ulaanba informal 228079.6 26636.47 175844.1 280315 .646969
Ulaanba inf_herd 7504.15 2270.255 3052.067 11956.23 .5561744
Multiplier treatment regional estimates
Total  Subpop. Estimate Std. Err.               [95% Conf. Interval] Deff
West informal 33616.65 6370.422 21127.48 46105.81 .7369472
West inf_herd 44515.95 11260.33 22440.16 66591.75 1.386683
Khangai informal 94409.63 60280.71 -23770.22 212589.5 8.795584
Khangai inf_herd 69999.98 12416.94 45656.67 94343.29 7.885287
Central informal 44090.66 6691.523 30971.98 57209.34 1.196376
Central inf_herd 70603.54 18232.55 34858.77 106348.3 6.687613
East informal 9990.853 1937.482 6192.435 13789.27 .6840574
East inf_herd 24581.44 10063.19 4852.639 44310.23 5.39251
Ulaanba informal 186669.1 10733.99 165625.2 207713 .5579795
Ulaanba inf_herd 5022.811 3291.728  -1430.596 11476.22 .8130742
Notes: Tables provide the ratios of activity. “Herd_ratio” is defined as HerdIRIS/HerdNSO. “Shadow” is defined as the Non-herding
Informal/(GDP-Bikales). “AVA_ratio” is (HerdIRIS+Non-herd InformalIRIS-InformalBikales-HerdNSO)/GDP
Variation of shadow activity by region and
location is presented in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. For
the non-herding informal sector, Ulaanbaatar
dominates in value with mean estimates of the share
of activity 49 percent in Treatment E and 51 percent
in Treatment M. After Ulaanbaatar activity is greatest
in Khangai, followed by the Central, Western, and
Eastern regions. There is some variability across
treatments as to the distribution of the types of activity
at the regional level. In particular, in the Khangai and
Central regions, where the bulk of the herding was
found, the multiplier treatment revealed significantly
less activity, leading us to believe that the multiplier
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As mentioned above with regard to the informal
sector ratio in Table 4.3, the ISHS revealed
substantially more value added than those
extrapolated from the Bikales et al. (1999) estimates
which covered trade, restaurant, and transportation
sectors. The growth in the informal sector is not,
however, due only to the additional sector coverage.
In fact the trade sector, which is the largest of the
sectors measured in the ISHS at 265 billion togrogs
(208 billion togrogs) in Treatment E (Treatment M),
is close in size to the total estimates extrapolated from
the Bikales survey (259 billion togrogs). Direct
comparisons with the restaurant sector indicate
growth as well as additional coverage of sub-sectors
in the ISHS, which included estimates of informal
lodging activity. The transport sector, which is the
third largest sector measured by the ISHS, is smaller
than the updated estimate of 102 billion togrogs
derived from the measures of Bikales et al. (1999).
The ISHS reports 48 billion togrogs in Treatment E
and 35 billion in Treatment M. The smaller transport
sector is surprising and indicates either a) under-
coverage in the current survey, b) an overestimate in
the previous informal sector survey, or c) a real
decline in the informal sector transport sector which
could arise from either a smaller sector or, more likely,
an increase in the formality of the sector.
Table 4.5 Location-specific measures of informal sector value added (billions of togrogs)
Envelope treatment location estimates
Total     Subpop. Estimate Std. Err.                 [95% Conf. Interval] Deff
Ulaanbaa informal 228079.6 26636.47 175844.1 280315 .646969
Ulaanbaa inf_herd 7504.15 2270.255 3052.067 11956.23 .5561744
Aimag_ce informal 128707.2 12489.91 104213.9 153200.6 .3916935
Aimag_ce inf_herd 14813.85 4764.767 5469.905  24157.8 .2891107
Soum_cen informal 89999.1 22540.31 45796.44 134201.8 2.396606
Soum_cen inf_herd 7339.272 4104.227  -709.3203 15387.86 1.653525
Rural informal 15872.82 6087.233 3935.449 27810.18 6.630088
Rural inf_herd 273259.3 57999.06 159520.2 386998.3 6.94573
Multiplier treatment location estimates
Total     Subpop. Estimate Std. Err.                 [95% Conf. Interval] Deff
Ulaanbaa informal 186669.1 10733.99 165625.2 207713 .5579795
Ulaanbaa inf_herd 5022.811 3291.728 -1430.596 11476.22 .8130742
Aimag_ce informal 85930.05 6391.349  73399.86 98460.24 .3685774
Aimag_ce inf_herd 6344.091 2204.18 2022.813 10665.37 .2563898
Soum_cen informal 83431.61 60451.44 -35082.96 201946.2 9.287993
Soum_cen inf_herd 29653.56 16945.32 -3567.618 62874.73 2.842539
Rural informal 12746.13 5206.918 2538.009 22954.25 4.305271
Rural inf_herd 173703.3 20457.81 133595.9 213810.6 7.559049
treatment was not well received in the herding
households. In addition, in the rural areas we did not
locate many informal sector (non-herding) shadow
economy businesses. Note that when the herding
sectors are included, the rural areas are second only
to Ulaanbaatar in terms of total informal sector output.
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TABLE 4.6  Shadow activity, sector level (by top-level ISIC)
Envelope treatment location estimates
Total     Subpop. Estimate Std. Err.                 [95% Conf. Interval] Deff
Ag 322714.3 58822.09 207361.2 438067.4 5.605484
Fishing         30.29535       30.29535        -29.11535              89.70606 0.4505077
Mining     3814.865   1512.79       848.2075         6781.523 1.413589
Manufact   79777.81   9709.726   60736.55     98819.07 0.8499624
Elec_gas       348.0964     270.7714      -182.9            879.0928 0.4146345
Construc     5107.539   1541.498     2084.584         8130.494 0.5577638
Trade 264640.1 32306.88 201284.7 327995.5 0.8748234
Hotel_Re   26013.19   5837.979   14564.62     37461.76 0.6886468
Transpor   48416.68   6866.617   34950.89     61882.46 0.4936939
Finance     3761.817   1932.469        -27.85063         7551.485 0.7386012
Real_Est     4316.387   1384.739     1600.844         7031.929 0.5843889
Educ       354.4417     224.8522        -86.50483             795.3882 0.4601628
Health     5322.366   4305.007    -3119.969   13764.7 0.359852
Other_Co       582.2341   9812.765  -18661.09     19825.56 0.6484286
Priv_hou       373.5442     332.4321      -278.3719       1025.46 0.7020484
Other           1.592725         1.592725          -1.530688              4.716137 0.0683262
Multiplier treatment location estimates
Total     Subpop. Estimate Std. Err.                 [95% Conf. Interval] Deff
Ag 245468.7 32748 181266.5  309670.9 4.434961
Fishing       541.1902     458.6076            -357.9066        1440.287 7.998247
Mining     2516.155     804.1304             939.6639        4092.647 1.183033
Manufact   53779.98   5143.895     43695.41     63864.55 0.5944037
Elec_gas       468.8083     182.4192             111.1768          826.4397 0.5213296
Construc     4805.031   1202.577         2447.388         7162.674 0.5019692
Trade 208474 58344.49     94090.05 322857.9 6.244412
Hotel_Re   12381.85   2968.123         6562.867     18200.83 0.7866985
Transpor   34797.74   5470.339     24073.18   45522.3 0.7547262
Finance     2116.247   1435.573            -698.1834        4930.677 0.4598493
Real_Est     3713.169   1106.898         1543.104         5883.233 0.6124611
Educ     1789.043   1402.336            -960.2259        4538.313 0.6066508
Health     2653.418   1181.293            337.5012        4969.334 1.376959
Other_Co     9249.018   1385.108        6533.524    11964.51 0.6134121
Priv_hou       593.9755     367.5629           -126.6288      1314.58 0.6939072
Other       100.7402       50.02167                    2.673126      198.8073 0.9539653
Two other results regarding sector size that are
surprising are the relatively small size of the mining
sector and a large manufacturing sector. Recent
research suggests that gold mining in particular is a
significant component of informal activity (MBDA
2003). One possibility is that actors in the mining sector
may have misreported the nature of their activity to
retain secrecy. The large manufacturing and trade
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sectors may be capturing some of this activity,
although it would require additional work, such as
random resurveying of respondents in these groups
to determine the extent of a problem with
misclassification. Alternatively, the distribution of
mining activity may be such that it is not amenable to
observation in a national level survey. Note that the
level of mining activity in the ISHS is roughly
comparable to those uncovered in the recent Labor
Force Survey, with regards to the number of
workers25.
One further set of results is presented before
discussing issues associated with the precision of the
estimates. The figures in Table 4.7 present the shares
of the components of activity by breaking the total
supply of goods and services into mixed income
(which includes indirect taxes), compensation,
depreciation, and intermediate consumption. These
results are fairly consistent across treatments with
the exception of some smaller sectors such as
TABLE 4.7  Shares of components of economic activity, by sector
Envelope Method
ISIC at top level -
numeric mean(mix_~r) mean(dep_~r) mean(comp~r) mean(int_~r) mean(tot_~r)
Ag 0.51 0.13 0.04 0.32 1.00
Fishing
Mining 0.58 0.00 0.02 0.39 1.00
Manufact 0.58 0.01 0.04 0.37 1.00
Elec_gas_water 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.32 1.00
Construction 0.46 0.02 0.19 0.34 1.00
Trade 0.55 0.02 0.02 0.41 1.00
Hotel_Rest 0.39 0.07 0.15 0.39 1.01
Transport_Storage 0.56 0.06 0.02 0.36 1.00
Finance 0.65 0.10 0.00 0.24 1.00
Real_Estate 0.43 0.08 0.14 0.35 1.01
Educ 0.81 0.02 0.00 0.16 1.00
Health 0.05 0.12 0.33 0.50 1.01
Other_Comm_Soc_Pers 0.60 0.03 0.03 0.34 1.00
Priv_households 0.40 0.02 0.00 0.58 1.00
Total 0.52 0.05 0.07 0.36 1.00
25 Tables on the number of households by sector are included in Section 5
education and health in which coverage was sparse.
Accuracy and non-normality of the data.  All
estimates of the size of the informal economy derived
from the ISHS enumeration are accompanied by
confidence intervals that are a measure of the
accuracy of the estimates.  A 95-percent confidence
interval implies that if the survey were conducted 100
times, with a new random sample of households drawn
from the same sampling frame each time, we would
expect the mean value calculated to be within the
confidence interval 95 of those 100 times. While we
would like this interval to be small, in most of the
results presented above the confidence intervals are
fairly large. One reason for this is that the confidence
interval calculations are based on an assumption that
the underlying values are normally distributed,
whereas the actual distribution is not normal. Instead
we find a much higher number of observations with
extreme values increasing the variance of the
estimates.
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Multiplier Method
ISIC at top level -
numeric mean(mix_~r) mean(dep_~r) mean(comp~r) mean(int_~r) mean(tot_~r)
Ag 0.56 0.05 0.07 0.32 1.00
Fishing 0.84 0.01 0.00 0.16 1.00
Mining 0.37 0.11 0.26 0.26 0.92
Manufact 0.59 0.02 0.05 0.35 1.00
Elec_gas_water 0.45 0.09 0.07 0.39 1.01
Construction 0.42 0.03 0.27 0.28 1.00
Trade 0.60 0.02 0.02 0.37 1.00
Hotel_Rest 0.44 0.03 0.11 0.42 1.00
Transport_Storage 0.55 0.05 0.03 0.37 1.00
Financ 0.50 0.04 0.08 0.38 1.00
Real_Estate 0.47 0.07 0.09 0.37 1.01
Educ 0.10 0.09 0.29 0.52 1.02
Health 0.47 0.07 0.14 0.31 1.01
Other_Comm_Soc_Pers 0.51 0.03 0.07 0.39 1.00
Priv_households 0.55 0.07 0.00 0.38 1.00
Total 0.49 0.05 0.10 0.35 1.00
One indicator of the degree of non-normality of
the value added data can be derived from the
interquartile range of the distribution. The inter-
quartile range identifies the width of the band between
the 25th and 75th percentile, and a region of outliers
derived from this measure that should comprise 0.7
percent of the values in a normal distribution contained
more than 11 percent of the observations in both the
envelope and multiplier treatments of the ISHS
sample. Our tests for outliers indicate that these firms
gave economically consistent results and so should
not be excluded from the dataset. These outliers,
however, comprise a large share of the value added,
34 percent in the envelope treatment and 45 percent
in the multiplier treatment after the adjustment
process described above.  The outliers are surprisingly
dense in the soum centers of the west and Khangai
regions, suggesting that refinements and updates of
the informal sector measurements might sample
more heavily from these areas. The potential for
optimizing future efforts based on what we have
learned about the variability of value added and survey
costs is further discussed in Section 6.2
Figure 4.1 presents the density of value added
for the informal sector (non-herding) in the multiplier
treatment26. Particularly noticeable is the rapid decline
in the number of firms at relatively low levels of value
added. A normal distribution would have significantly
more firms in the area from zero to 50,000,000
togrogs, given the number of firms in the upper tail.
The estimates of confidence bands implicitly assumes
that those firms in fact do exist which creates the
larger than expected confidence intervals.
26 Using the envelope treatment or including the herding sector does not substantially change the graphic or the issues associated with
the non-normality..
TABLE 4.7  continued
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FIGURE 4.1  Density estimate of value added, multiplier treatment
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hile the GDP measurement results reported
in Section 4 provide important insights, in
this section we extend the analysis in three stages in
order to come to a fuller understanding of the informal
sector shadow economy in Mongolia. Section 5.1
presents relevant descriptive statistics on business,
household, and personal characteristics. Where
relevant, comparisons are made to formal sector
business owners, wage earners, and the unemployed.
To provide the most informative picture of the informal
shadow economy, descriptive statistics are presented
at varying levels of disaggregation. At a minimum we
break the informal sector into two parts, a herding
sector (ISIC 012) and all other sectors.  References
to the herding sector will be explicit in both the text
and tables and so throughout this section, whenever
the informal sector is mentioned, the animal herding
sector is excluded.  Additional statistics by ISIC are
presented both to understand the overall distribution
of activity and because differences across ISIC, for
example with regard to regulatory environment, are
relevant to understanding causes or consequences of
shadow participation in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
While the discussion and tables below create a
rich picture of the informal sector, one should keep
in mind that it is but a descriptive picture based on
bivariate correlations (relationships between two
characteristics).  In order to generate a more insightful
and precise understanding additional multivariate
analysis is recommended (see Section 6.2).27  One
such model, presented in Table 5.74, is used to assess
how formal and informal sector business owners
differ. This approach adds additional insight by
allowing the analyst to control for personal
characteristics, social attitudes, location and sector
characteristics. This section does not attempt to pool
treatment observations or sort out which elicitation
(treatment) method is most appropriate for a particular
question. Again, this important task must await the
Policy issues
next phase of analysis.
Finally, note that most tables in this section end
with a row labeled “Total”. This refers to the average
value of all observations related to the column’s
entries and is also weighted by the characteristic used
to disaggregate the column. Thus, the “Total” is not a
simple average of the figures in the column.
5.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR
SHADOW ECONOMY
In this section we lay the groundwork for
understanding the causes and social consequences
of the informal sector shadow economy by presenting
data from the ISHS on personal, household and
business characteristics. While our primary interest
is in informal sector self-employment there is much
to be learned from a comparative analysis. As a result
we present data on the formal and animal herding
sector alongside the informal sector results. When
relevant we also present data collected from wage
earners and the unemployed.
Household and personal characteristics
Based on data on household and personal
characteristics in survey Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 we
compute descriptive statistics on comparisons across
all respondent types. With the exception of the
unemployed,28 we find from Table 5.3 that there is
little age variability across the different groups,
although formal sector workers are slightly older than
both informal workers and wage workers.  Gender,
as shown in Table 5.4 is fairly balanced across the
different employment statuses with the exception of
herding, where 66 percent of the respondents are
male. Among the self-employed, women show a slight
majority in the formal sector among primary earners,
and predominate in all sectors among the secondary
earners.
W
27 Examples of such methods includes probit and multinomial logit analysis, analysis of variance, multiple regression (both single and
multi-equation), to mention a few.
28 The survey lumps the unemployed and retired together. Hence, below, the employment status of unemployed should be interpreted as
including pensioners.
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The distribution of all respondent types is given
in Table 5.1. We see that enumerators were largely
successful in achieving an important goal of the survey
protocol, which was to reach the primary earner
among the self-employed. Among the currently self-
employed, 6,914 (92 percent) of the respondents
were the primary earner and 592 (8 percent) the
secondary earner.
For purposes of reporting our results
respondent type is not the most informative
characteristic. Instead we distinguish three self-
employment categories: formal, informal, and informal
herding sectors. With the exception of our discussion
of shadow exit and entry, where we are interested in
whether there has been previous self-employment,
we group the wage earners together. The
unemployed remain a separate category. The resulting
five categories we term employment status.  Table
5.2 presents the survey respondents categorized by
employment status, and the estimate of the number
of households associated with each employment
status after the survey weights are applied—i.e.,
reflecting the country as a whole. Here we see that
informal employment in the herding and non-herding
sectors is associated with 48 percent of the
households while formal sector self-employment is
associated with 2.61 percent.
Table 5.5 shows that no major differences exist
in marital status across employment status, though
herders appear to be more conservative, eschewing
divorce and separation. Regarding education in Table
5.6, non-herder informals in general have a higher
level of education than herders and the formal sector
in turn has a higher level of education than the non-
herder informals. Finally, Table 5.7 indicates that while
there are no big differences in family size across
employment status, the unemployed have a family
size about 10 percent lower than the others.
TABLE 5.1  Respondent types
 Importance of self-employment income
to household
Importance Freq. Percent Cum.
Largest self-employed 6.914 36.37 36.37
Secondary
self-employed 592 3.11 39.48
Previous
self-employment 290 1.53 41.01
Never had 7.068 37.16 78.18
unemployed/pension 3.940 20.72 98.91
refused/unavailable 207   1.01 100.00
Total   19.011 100.00
TABLE 5.2  Households by employment status:
In-sample distribution
status2_n Freq. Percent Cum.
informal 5.695 29.56 29.56
inf_herd 1.106 5.82 35.77
formal 668 3.51 39.28
wage 7.382 38.82 78.12
unemp 3.953 20.78 98.91
Refus/unaval 207 1.01 100.00
Total 19.011 100.00
Country-wide distribution
status2_n Freq. Percent Cum.
informal 130.538.8  22.93 22.93
inf_herd 140.383.22 24.66 47.59
formal 14.885.886 2.61 50.21
wage 182.088.35 31.99 82.19
unemp 101.355.48 17.81 100.00
Total 569.251.73 100.00
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TABLE 5.3  Age by employment status
Mean   Subpop. Estimate Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] Deff
informal 39.27087     .2139249 38.85154 39.6902 1.224964
inf_herd 40.05263 .5546379 38.96545 41.13981 5.365314
formal 40.97127 .4584415 40.07265 41.86989 .6926921
wage 39.5766 .3859168 38.82014 40.33306 6.261933
unemp 56.98567 .666832 55.67858 58.29277 4.267169
TABLE 5.4  Gender by employment status
Question16
status2_n Male Female Total
informal .5047 .4953 1
inf_herd .6567 .3433 1
formal .4493 .5507 1
wage .5026 .4974 1
unemp .488 .512 1
Total .5371 .4629 1
Key:  row proportions
TABLE 5.5 Marital status by employment status
                                                               Question18
Employment
Status Never married Married Cohabit Separated Divorced Widowed Total
informal .0806 .7845 .0307 .014  .0303 .0601 1
inf_herd  .096 .8163 .0145 3.2e-05  .006 .0672 1
formal .0381 .8694  .016 .0148 .0193 .0424 1
wage .0749 .7904 .0408 .0156 .0172 .0612 1
unemp .0496 .6156 .0057 .0132 .0153 .3006 1
Total .0759 .7664 .0251 .0109 .0171 .1045 1
Key:  row proportions
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TABLE 5.6  Education by employment status
Employment Incomplete Incomplete Incomplete Incomplete
Status Primary Primary Secondary Secondary Technical Tech,/vo  Univ. Univ. Total
informal .0028 .0396 .2014 .4113 .0685 .1434 .1285 .0045 1
inf_herd .0366 .2325 .4348 .2065 .0251 .0456 .0167 .0022 1
formal 0 .0098 .0868 .2623 .0441 .2266 .3401 .0304 1
wage .0051 .0178 .1671 .2814 .0597 .2033 .2441 .0215 1
unemp .0216 .25 .3042 .2006 .0323 .1042 .0863 8.7e-04 1
Total .0152 .1169 .2633 .2778 .0479 .1336 .1359 .0094 1
Key:  row proportions
TABLE 5.7  Household size by employment status
Employment status  Mean score
informal 4.432
inf_herd 4.552
formal 4.364
wage 4.439
unemp 3.986
Total 4.383
Social attitudes
In this section we report on the results of questions
that provide insight into the social and personal
attitudes that may play a role in the type of economic
decisions that individuals make. These questions
cover a range of issues including patience, trust—
including trust of government, trustworthiness,
fairness and honesty, and the willingness to take
risks.29 There are noticeable differences across groups
for many of these questions, and in general the
herding sector has quite different attitudes than those
of the formal and informal sector business owners,
who are often similar to each other. We also report
on the responses of the wage earners and the
unemployed in this section.
We see in Table 5.8 that the formal sector
business owners exhibit significantly less patience
than others, a result that is consistent across two
question types.30 Their willingness to do an unspecified
but tedious task (q30) is significantly lower than for
all the other respondents and they show less
willingness to wait for service in a store (q36).  At the
other extreme are the herders who demonstrate the
most patience with regard to waiting times. The three
groups of the self-employed exhibit much less
variability with regard to this characteristic when
contrasted with the wage earners and the
unemployed.
29 Because of the sensitivity of these questions for the respondent, we report the descriptive statistics to these answers based on the
treatment protocols that used the Envelope Method of elicitation. See Section 2.2 for further discussion of the issues involved.
30 Note that the “average” yields a group response of less than 50 percent, indicating a bias or group myopia of one’s own relative
position.
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TABLE 5.8  Patience by employment status
                    Self-declared willing to do an unspecified but tedious task, relative to others
                                                                            Question30
Employment
Status Much higher Higher Average Lower Much low Total
informal .2062 .2725 .3332 .119 .0691 1
inf_herd .1702 .2786 .3575 .1456 .0481 1
formal .1108 .2333 .4044 .1687 .0828 1
wage .1915 .2475 .3763 .1033 .0814 1
unemp .1938 .2554 .3393 .1315 .0799 1
Total .1879 .2619 .3559 .1241 .0701 1
 Key:  row proportions
                                               Willing to wait for service at a shop:
Employment status| Estimate Std. Err.           [95% Conf. Interval]   Deff
informal 10.03879  .262588 9.524073 10.5535 1.713189
inf_herd 13.47106 .4256569 12.63671 14.30542 5.439461
formal  8.284828 .3888062 7.522705  9.046951  .8119865
wage 11.89009 .582362 10.74857 13.03162    7.440421
unemployed 12.19621 .7241248 10.77681 13.61561 8.011775
Wait time in minutes
Table 5.9 shows that the herding sector reports
much higher levels of trust than the other groups,
with the formal sector indicating the least trust.
Informal, wage, and unemployed respondents show
increasing levels of trust, between these two
extremes. With regard to whether people perceive
the respondent as trustworthy, there is little variability
across groups. A slightly higher proportion of herders
and the unemployed indicate higher trustworthiness
than the other groups, although the differences are
not statistically significant.
TABLE 5.9  Trust by employment status
            Question31
Employment|
Status        Most About half Few Total
informal .3468 .3907 .2625 1
inf_herd .6226 .2297 .1477 1
formal .358 .3015 .3405 1
wage .438 .3127 .2492 1
unemp .522 .2826 .1954 1
Total .4755 .3045 .22 1
Key:  row proportions
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TABLE 5.10  Trustworthiness, by employment status
Employment|                                                                 Question33
Status Much more More Same Less Much less Total
informal .0804 .1945 .6634 .0528 .0089 1
inf_herd .1016 .2104 .6384 .0411 .0084 1
formal .0649 .2422 .6641 .0261 .0027 1
wage .0771 .1677 .7163 .0283 .0106 1
unemp .1121 .2059 .6344 .0367 .011 1
Total .0898 .1931 .669 .0385 .0095 1
Key:  row proportions
Frequency of attendance at religious
establishments is fairly low nationwide, with 73 percent
attending either not at all or only once or twice a year.
There is some variability across locations with more
attendance in urban areas. We cannot determine from
this data, however if the difference results primarily
from proximity to religious institutions.
TABLE 5.11  Frequency in 2004 of religious observation, by location
Aimag Soum
Frequency Ulaanbaar Center Center     Rural Total
Never 0.2446 0.2467 0.3235 0.3963 0.3088
Once/twi 0.3936 0.4193 0.4683 0.3924 0.4188
About ev 0.1771 0.1554 0.1276 0.0929 0.136
Monthly 0.0959 0.1053 0.0383 0.0657 0.0734
More tha 0.0889 0.0733 0.0423 0.0527 0.063
Total 1 1 1 1 1
Key:  column proportions
The herders and unemployed indicate a greater
commitment to honesty, when asked if there are ever
good reasons to lie to someone else (q34). Self-
employed business owners report the least honesty
and wage earners intermediate values. There is little
difference between formal and informal business
owners with regards to this question.  Similar results
are found regarding character issues such as whether
people will take advantage of others, given the chance,
or be fair (q35). The fairness question, perhaps
because it is dichotomous, shows the biggest
difference across groups, with 73 percent of herders
believing people would be fair as compared to only 42
percent and 49 percent of the formal and informal
self-employed.
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TABLE 5.12  Good reasons for lying, by employment status
Employment Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
status Agree Agree Unsure Disagree Disagree Total
informal .1563 .3707 .1782 .1345 .1603 1
inf_herd .0815 .2672 .1573 .149 .345 1
formal .1739 .3735 .1424 .1228 .1874 1
wage .1166 .3958 .1573 .1247 .2057 1
unemp .0812 .2221 .2612 .1236 .3119 1
Total .1122 .3268 .1802 .1327 .2481    1
Key:  row proportions
TABLE 5.13 Fairness, by employment status
Employment
Status take adv be fair Total
informal .5119 .4881 1
inf_herd .2694 .7306 1
formal .5812 .4188 1
wage .4655 .5345 1
unemp .2828 .7172 1
Total .3983 .6017 1
Key:  row proportions
With regard to risk attitudes the herding sector
is the least risk averse based on two measures, 1)
their willingness to pay for a risky lottery is significantly
greater than all other groups, and 2) given a choice
between a risky lottery (Game A in Table 5.15) and a
safe one (Game B) the herders are most likely to
choose the risky one. The differences among the
other groups are not statistically significant. There
seems to be an accurate self-perception among the
herders that they are more risk seeking than others
(q46).
TABLE 5.14 Willingness to pay to play the game
in Question 42, by employment status
Employment Willingness to household
status play game (togrogs) income
informal 1816 1563116
informal herders 2519 864889
formal 2046 2637707
wage 1900 1481592
unemployed 1348 413549
TABLE 5.15 Game preference, by employment
status
Employment status Game A Game B Total
informal .3652 .6348 1
inf_herd .4509 .5491 1
formal .3757 .6243 1
wage .4196 .5804 1
unemp .39 .61 1
Total .4084 .5916 1
Game A is the riskier game
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TABLE 5.16 Self-perception of risk-taking relative to others, by employment status
Employment status less willing equally more willing Total
informal  .4169 .4918 .0913 1
inf_herd .37 .4754 .1546 1
formal .4018 .5053 .0929 1
wage .3952 .5075 .0973 1
unemp .5019 .401 .0971 1
Total .4131 .477 .1099 1
Key:  row proportions
Finally a question was asked about attitudes
regarding competence and reliability of the
government and was supplemented by a question to
identify those who have had problematic interactions
with government officials. The first, (q40) asked “How
much of the time can you trust the government to do
what is right?” and the second (q41) whether they
had ever been unfairly treated by a government
official. The responses to the first question, presented
in, Table 5.17 are dispersed across employment status
in a way that is similar to those we have observed in
other attitudinal questions. The unemployed
expressed the most confidence in government
activity followed closely by those in the herding sector,
with business owners in the formal sector expressing
the least. In the population as a whole about 60 percent
believe that the government will often or always do
what is right. This varies between 48 percent in the
formal sector and 69 percent in the informal herding
sector.  The attitudinal responses were closely
correlated with the information respondents provided
on the quality of their actual contacts and resulting
treatment by government officials (Table 5.18).  While
only 19 percent of herders had experienced unfair
treatment by a government official, 47 percent in the
formal sector reported this - a figure that falls to 32
percent in the informal sector.
TABLE 5.17 Trust in the government, by employment status
                   Question40
Employment
Status Never Rarely Sometime Often Always Total
informal .0518 .1191 .3039 .355 .1702 1
inf_herd .0246 .0457 .2411 .3563 .3322 1
formal .0457 .139 .332 .3594 .124 1
wage .0545 .0863 .2802 .3753 .2037 1
unemp .0438 .0909 .2518 .3557 .2578 1
Total .0444 .086 .2723 .3621 .2352 1
Key:  row proportions
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TABLE 5.18 Maltreatment by government
officials, by employment status
Question41
Employment Never Once/twice More than Total
Status twice
informal .6847 .2232 .0921 1
inf_herd .8114 .1443 .0443 1
formal .5291 .3232 .1477 1
wage .6526 .262 .0855 1
unemp .7394 .1932 .0674 1
Total .7113 .2134 .0753 1
Key:  row proportions
Status distribution of the informal sector
economy
The survey indicates that a total of 285,808
households had current self-employment income in
September 2004, with the largest number, 140,383,
in the informal herding sector followed by informal
non-herding, and a much smaller formal sector.  The
distribution by region (Table 5.20) and location (Table
5.21) shows variability as expected with Ulaanbaatar
and the aimag centers in Khangai and Central regions
having the bulk of the formal activity.
TABLE 5.19 Number of self-employed households,
by employment status
Status                  Number of households
informal 130.539
inf_herd 140.383
formal 14.886
Total 285.808
Figures are based on primary self-employment activity
TABLE 5.20 Regional distribution of the number
of self-employed households, by
employment status
         Employment status
region   informal inf_herd formal Total
West 14.686 36.655 883 52.224
Khangai 29.445 52.106 3.925 85.476
Central 20.195 32.999 2.499 55.693
East 3.822 16.134 95 20.050
Ulaanbaatar 62.390 2.489 7.485 72.364
Total 130.539 140.383 14.886285.808
TABLE 5.21 Location distribution of the number
of self-employed households, by
employment status
                   Employment status
Location   informal inf_herd formal Total
Ulaanbaatar 62.390 2.489 7.485 72.364
Aimag center 35.265 3.346 4.434 43.044
Soum center 25.924  7.201 2.418 35.543
Rural 6.960 127.347 550 134.856
Total 130.539 140.383 14.886285.808
The proportion of households with self-
employment activity is presented below, also with
tabulations at the regional and location level. At the
national level the informal makes up 46 percent,
informal herding 49 percent, and the formal sector 5
percent of the self-employed households according
the NSO’s classification methodology.
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TABLE 5.23 Regional distribution of the number
of self-employed households, by
employment status
TABLE 5.24 Location distribution of the number
of self-employed households, by
employment status
location=Aimag center
status Est. Prop. Std. Err.
informal 0.819266 0.007743
inf_herd 0.077723 0.005536
formal  0.103012 0.006032
location=Soum center
status Est. Prop. Std. Err.
informal 0.729372 0.027167 |
inf_herd 0.202612 0.025695 |
formal 0.068016 0.011710 |
location=Rural
status Est. Prop. Std. Err.
informal 0.051607 0.009274
inf_herd  0.944316 0.009585
formal 0.004077 0.002532
Sectoral distribution of the informal sector
shadow by ISIC
In this section we look more closely at how economic
activity is distributed across ISIC codes. Figures on
the formal sector are provided for comparison, and
tables for national, regional, and location specific
distributions are presented for the top level ISIC. We
present two types of cross-tabulations at the national
level, the first showing the share of activity within
each ISIC by employment status, and the second
showing the share across informal status, so that the
TABLE 5.22 National distribution of the number
of self-employed households, by
employment status
Empl. status Est. Prop. Std. Err.
informal 0.456736 0.011041 |
inf_herd 0.491180 0.011813 |
formal 0.052084 0.002759 |
Total 1.000000
region=Ulaanbaatar
status Est. Prop. Std. Err
informal 0.862171 0.006568
inf_herd  0.034401 0.003595
formal 0.103429 0.005747
region=Khangai
status Est. Prop. Std. Err
informal 0.344483 0.022003
inf_herd 0.609598 0.023356
formal 0.045919 0.005748
region=Central
status Est. Prop. Std. Err
informal 0.362619 0.022102
inf_herd 0.592518 0.023412
formal 0.044862 0.006587
region=East
status Est. Prop. Std. Err
informal 0.190609 0.021729
inf_herd 0.804656 0.022008
formal 0.004735 0.002391
region= West
status Est. Prop. Std. Err.
informal 0.281215 0.021793
inf_herd 0.701879 0.022416
formal 0.016906 0.002700
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least 15 percent of the firms. These subsectors
include food beverage and tobacco specialty stores
(ISIC 522 at 33.2 percent), non specialized retail (ISIC
521 22.9 percent), retail trade not in stores (ISIC 525
at 16.5 percent), and other specialized retail trade of
new items (ISIC 523 at 15.0 percent).
While the formal and informal sectors have
identical share of firms in trade, the informal sector
has a greater concentration of businesses in
manufacturing (ISIC D at 20.4 percent versus 10.4
percent for formal) and transport storage and
communications (ISIC I at 11.4 percent versus 5.3
percent for formal). Formal sector activity is
substantially higher in the hotel and restaurant sector
(ISIC H at 4.5 percent for informal, 10.8 percent
formal). Following the tables on proportions of activity
is Table 5.27 with the number of businesses by ISIC
at the national level.
TABLE 5.25 Sectoral distribution of self-employed households, by employment status
                         Self-employment sector household distribution - across sectors
ISIC |informal inf_herd formal Total
Ag 0.0441 1 0.0616 0.5145
Fishing 5.30E-04 0 0 2.40E-04
Mining 0.0092 0 0.0039 0.0044
Manufact 0.2044 0 0.1037 0.0987
Elec_gas 0.0019 0 0.0023 9.70E-04
Construc 0.0219 0 0.0216 0.0111
Trade 0.4994 0 0.5004 0.2542
Hotel_Re 0.0449 0 0.1077 0.0261
Transpor 0.114 0 0.0527 0.0548
Finance 0.0031 0 0.0296 0.003
Real_Est 0.0106 0 0.0199 0.0059
Educ 0.0021 0 0.0138 0.0017
Health 0.0042 0 0.0389 0.004
Other_Co 0.0382 0 0.0439 0.0197
Priv_hou 0.0016 0 0 7.30E-04
Total 1 1 1 1
Key:  column proportions
relative size of the informal and formal sectors can be
more easily appreciated.
The first panel in Table 5.25 shows that trade
activity, which includes wholesale, retail, and repairs,
represents 50 percent of total economic activity in
both the formal and informal sectors. The second
panel in Table 5.25 shows that within the trade sector
90 percent of the households are in the informal
sector.
Taking a closer look at trade by using the three-
digit ISIC code, Table 5.26 indicates that there is
relative specialization across the formal and informal
sectors. The largest share of informal activity is in
retail trade not in stores (ISIC 525 at 39 percent)
followed by non-specialized trade in stores (ISIC 521
at 19.5 percent) and food, beverage and tobacco sales
in stores (ISIC 522 at 16.5 percent).  Formal sector
activity is spread somewhat more evenly across the
trade sector with four of the sub-sectors having at
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Self-employment sector household distribution - within ISIC sector
ISIC |informal inf_herd formal Total
Ag 0.0391 0.9546 0.0062 1
Fishing 1 0 0 1
Mining 0.9541 0 0.0459 1
Manufact 0.9453 0 0.0547 1
Elec_gas 0.8795 0 0.1205 1
Construc 0.899 0 0.101 1
Trade 0.8975 0 0.1025 1
Hotel_Re 0.785 0 0.215 1
Transpor 0.9499 0 0.0501 1
Finance 0.4786 0 0.5214 1
Real_Est 0.8232 0 0.1768 1
Educ 0.5735 0 0.4265 1
Health 0.4889 0 0.5111 1
Other_Co 0.8841 0 0.1159 1
Priv_hou 1 0 0 1
Total 0.4567 0.4912 0.0521 1
Key:  row proportions
TABLE 5.26 Self-employed household distribution
of trade ISICs, by employment status
ISIC3 informal formal Total
501 0.0036 0.0118 0.0044
502 0.033 0.0214 0.0318
503 0.0054 0.0097 0.0059
504 0.0034 0.0036 0.0034
505 0.0024 0.0182 0.004
511 2.20E-04 0 2.00E-04
512 0.0609 0.0319 0.0579
513 0.0037 0 0.0033
514 0.0047 0.0028 0.0045
515 0.003 0.0041 0.0031
519 0.0031 0 0.0027
521 0.1947 0.2289 0.1982
522 0.1649 0.3327 0.1821
523 0.0766 0.1505 0.0842
524 0.0178 0.0071 0.0167
525 0.3853 0.1645 0.3626
526 0.0373 0.0126 0.0348
Total 1 1 1
Key:  column proportions
TABLE 5.27 Number of self-employed households,
by sector and employment status
ISIC informal inf_herd formal Total
Ag 5,756 140,383 917 147,056
Fishing 69 69
Mining 1,197 58 1,254
Manufact 26,679 1,543 28,222
Elec_gas_water 245 34 278
Construction 2,862 322 3,184
Trade 65,191 7,449 72,640
Hotel_Rest 5,855 1,604 7,459
Transport_Storage 14,880 785 15,665
Finance 404 440 845
Real_Estate 1,380 296  1,676
Educ 277 206 483
Health 554 580 1,134
Other_Comm_
Soc_Pers 4,982 653 5,635
Priv_households 208 208
Total 130,539 140,383 14,886 285,808
TABLE 5.25 continued
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Firm size
As shown in Table 5.28, formal sector businesses are
larger than both animal herding and other informal
sector businesses. The figures below include the
business owner.
TABLE 5.28 Average firm size of self-employed
households, by employment status
status Number of employees
informal 2.30
inf_herd 2.91
formal 4.86
Total 2.74
TABLE 5.29 Number of employees and average efforts, by employment status
Informal Mean Estimate Std. Err.            [95% Conf. Interval] Deff
Household wage employees 0.033711 0.0045782 0.0247362 0.0426861 1.219944
Non-household wage empls. 0.200954 0.0124409 0.1765651 0.225343 1.059259
Unpaid household workers 0.421403 0.0170331 0.3880119 0.454795 1.465887
Av. hrs employee worked 44.58037 0.7320086 43.1448 46.01593 1.542626
(*) Some variables contain missing values.
Herding Mean Estimate Std. Err.            [95% Conf. Interval]          Deff
Household wage employees 0.007388 0.0035662 0.0003902 0.0143851 1.054602
Non-household wage empls. 0.048415 0.0083038 0.0321212 0.0647077 0.7777277
Unpaid household workers 1.116973 0.0528095 1.013353 1.220593 1.507635
Av. hrs employee worked 35.29553 1.882405 31.59908 38.99198 1.889963
(*) Some variables contain missing values.
Formal Mean Estimate Std. Err.           [95% Conf. Interval]         Deff
Household wage employees 0.076218 0.0170619 0.042714 0.1097223 1.566104
Non-household wage empls. 1.99694 0.2273022 1.550591 2.44329 0.9472176
Unpaid household workers 0.467783 0.0837656 0.3032942 0.6322725 0.8699874
Av. hrs employee worked 49.49582 1.312898 46.91419 52.07745 1.143062
Payment Method
Table 5.29 provides a window into household
employee remuneration. Wage payments to
household members are rare across all business
statuses, with wage employees most prevalent in the
formal sector as expected.31 Unpaid family workers
are employed at roughly the same rate in the formal
and the non-herding informal sector, however among
these informal businesses the unpaid family worker
is the predominant type of employee. Employees
work more and are better paid in the formal sector.
Average hours worked by employees in the week
prior to the interview rises with formality (q98). Animal
31 Here, the number .03, for example, means three households in one hundred have a household employee of the particular type.
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TABLE 5.32 Membership and participation in trade associations, by employment status
status Member of Association status Participated/Paid fee
Yes No Total Yes No Total
informal 0.0158 0.9842 1 informal 0.6913 0.3087 1
inf_herd 0.0067 0.9933 1 inf_herd 0.2157 0.7843 1
formal 0.08 0.92 1 formal 0.8807 0.1193 1
Total 0.0147 0.9853 1 Total 0.6401 0.3599 1
Key:  row proportions           Key:  row proportions
TABLE 5.30 Cost of an additional hour of employee labor, by employment status
Cost of extra hr. Estimate Std. Err.                 [95% Conf. Interval] Deff
informal 386.54 33.77216 320.2695 452.8118 1.05095
inf_herd 47.33 25.31557 -2.343736 97.00982 2.794927
formal 666.18 137.6798 396.0176 936.356 1.110463
Intensity of activity
The difference in the amount of time spent in the
formal and informal sector business activity by the
owners shows little variation, although both groups
do report significant breaks from business activity of
between two and three months per year. Animal
herders report the largest number of days per month
(29 days, September report) and the most months
per year of activity (11.5 months).
TABLE 5.31 Level of effort in September 2004,
by employment status
Days worked in Months work
  status September per year
informal 23.06 9.15
inf_herd 28.85 11.55
formal 25.46 9.95
Total 26.03 10.37
Association activity
Collective action in the private sector is often abetted
through business associations. Associational activity
is low in Mongolia, with more than 98 percent
reporting that they are uninvolved in business
associations. The formal sector shows significantly
higher activity, with 8 percent of businesses in
associations, and less than 2 percent in the informal
sector.  There is some variation by sector regarding
strength of association. For example, in the informal
sector both financial service providers and educators
have relatively high rates of association (16 percent
and 9 percent). In the formal sector, mining (38
percent), construction (29 percent), manufacturing
(18 percent), and real estate (18 percent) have the
highest rates of associational membership. Among
those who do participate in associations, a majority
(67 percent) pay association fees. There is variation
across formality in the rate at which businesses pay
for associational memberships, 22 percent in the
herding sector, 69 percent among other informals,
and 88 percent in the formal sector. See Table 5.32
and Table 5.33 for additional details.
herder employees worked 36 hours, informal sector
workers 46 hours, and formal sector employees
averaged 50 hours. Our estimate of the marginal
product of labor is presented in Table 5.30 as the
amount required to hire a worker for one additional
hour. This ranges from a negligible amount (47
togrogs) among the herders, to 387 togrogs among
informals, and 666 togrogs per hour among the formal
sector businesses.
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TABLE 5.33 Membership in trade associations, by economic sector
Non-herding Informal Formal
                     Member of Association                       Member of Association
ISIC Yes No Total ISIC Yes No Total
Ag 0.009 0.991 1 Ag 0.0508 0.9492 1
Fishing 0 1 1 Mining 0.381 0.619 1
Mining 0 1 1 Manufact 0.1818 0.8182 1
Manufact 0.0069 0.9931 1 Elec_gas 0 1 1
Elec_gas 0 1 1 Construc 0.2924 0.7076 1
Construc 0 1 1 Trade 0.0347 0.9653 1
Trade 0.0174 0.9826 1 Hotel_Re 0.0994 0.9006 1
Hotel_Re 0.0169 0.9831 1 Transpor 0.0592 0.9408 1
Transpor 0.0159 0.9841 1 Finance 0.1407 0.8593 1
Finance 0.1551 0.8449 1 Real_Est 0.1846 0.8154 1
Real_Est 0.0106 0.9894 1 Educ 0 1 1
Educ 0.0925 0.9075 1 Health 0.1637 0.8363 1
Health 0.0246 0.9754 1 Other_Co 0.1114 0.8886 1
Other_Co 0.0419 0.9581 1
Priv_hou 0.1423 0.8577 1 Total 0.08 0.92 1
Total 0.0158 0.9842 1
Key:  row proportions
Business formality – recordkeeping,
workplace permanence, ownership type
Our results so far have made use of definitions of
formality associated with registration as legal entities.
The adoption of business practices typically associated
with formal sector activity provides another measure
to assess the informal sector. Written accounts,
permanence in the place of business, and ownership
type are three ways we examine both within and
across our registration definitions of formality to shed
light on the nature of informal sector shadow activity.
(See Table 5.34, Table 5.35, and Table 5.36 for details)
Formal firms are more than twice as likely to
have written accounts (77 percent versus 36 percent).
Forty-nine percent of the informals in the trade sector
keep written accounts as do 86 and 59 percent in the
finance and restaurant/hotel sectors. Among the
larger informal sectors written records are scarce in
manufacturing (20 percent), transport, storage and
communications (11 percent), and construction (9
percent).
Business workplace type is another area we
might expect differences across the formal and
informal sector, and we have already reported some
evidence of this with regard to trade, with 39 percent
of informal trading firms outside of regular store
location (ISIC 525). Interestingly, about the same
proportion of businesses are based in the home in
the formal (30 percent) and informal sectors (36
percent). When the workplace is outside the home
however there is consistently more variability in
workplace type in the informal sector, with 28 percent
of informal businesses in a fixed shop as compared to
52 percent of formal sector firms.  Informal sector
businesses are roughly 3 times more likely to be
located in market stalls, motor vehicles, or other
variable locations than formal sector businesses.
With regards to ownership type the informal
and formal sectors do not differ greatly with 64 percent
and 60 percent reporting sole ownership respectively.
The herding sector reports only 43 percent sole
ownership and 57 percent family partnership.
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All self-employment
status Shop/plant Shop/plant Market Location Motor Grass Other Total
at home not at home stall varies vehicle
informal 0.3554 0.2765 0.1195 0.1229 0.0875 0.0369 0.0014 1
inf_herd 0.0728 0.0698 5.70E-04 0.0638 0.0014 0.7917 0 1
formal 0.2961 0.5173 0.0377 0.0565 0.0331 0.0574 0.0018 1
Total 0.2135 0.1875 0.0568 0.0904 0.0424 0.4087 7.10E-04 1
Key:  row proportions
     Question93
Sole own Partner Partner Total
status in family non-family
informal 0.6363 0.3017 0.062 1
inf_herd 0.4314 0.5646 0.0041 1
formal 0.611 0.2925 0.0965 1
Total 0.5343 0.4304 0.0353 1
TABLE 5.35 Maintenance of written accounts, by economic sector
status Yes No Total                                     Question106
informal 0.3578 0.6422 1 ISIC   Yes No Total
inf_herd 0.3238 0.6762 1 Ag 0.1327 0.8673 1
formal 0.7742 0.2258 1 Fishing 0 1 1
Total 0.3628 0.6372 1 Mining 0.0638 0.9362 1
Manufact 0.1958 0.8042 1
Key:  row proportions Elec_gas 0.5779 0.4221 1
Construc 0.0905 0.9095 1
Õóäàëäàà 0.4941 0.5059 1
Hotel_Re 0.591 0.409 1
Transpor 0.1092 0.8908 1
Finance 0.8638 0.1362 1
Real_Est 0.3627 0.6373 1
Educ 0.427 0.573 1
Health 0.5548 0.4452 1
Other_Co 0.3312 0.6688 1
Priv_hou 0.1324 0.8676 1
Total 0.3578 0.6422 1
Key:  row proportions
TABLE 5.34 Ownership type, by employment
status
Key:  row proportions
TABLE 5.36 Primary workplace type, by employment status
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Finance
One of the key ingredients of business success is its
access to financing. For the present purposes we
consider the sources and start-up financing and the
informal business’s experience with borrowing. The
sources of start-up capital are given in Table 5.37. As
seen, 64 percent (for formal small businesses) to 88
percent (herders) come from own (or family) sources.
The rest is spread out among the other possible
sources, with banks being about as important as
moneylenders or family friends. Nonetheless, Table
5.40 suggests that only about one-eighth of informal
businesses (13 percent) have ever borrowed,
compared to more than a quarter (27 percent) for
formal small businesses. Perhaps the good news is
that the table suggests a strong increase in borrowing
for those who have engaged in it.
TABLE 5.37 Source of business start-up capital, by employment status
status Family or
own saving Friend Moneylender Cooperative Bank Other Total
informal 0.7591 0.0702 0.0613 0.0136 0.0725 0.0233 1
inf_herd 0.8813 0.0134 5.60E-04 0.0049 0.0093 0.0906 1
formal 0.6373 0.0639 0.1029 0.0347 0.1431 0.0181 1
Total 0.8128 0.042 0.0336 0.0104 0.0452 0.0561 1
Key:  row proportions
Bank loan use is more widespread for continuing
investment than for startup capital. Among the 9
percent of firms that have borrowed in the last 12
months, banks are the predominant source at 63
percent followed by friends/family and moneylenders
(15 percent each). The herding sector is the most
likely to have made use of bank lending, with 86
percent, citing banks as a source of funds. This
compares to 54 percent among the informal firms and
71 percent in the formal sector.
 status Family/f Cooperative Pawnshop Bank Supplier Customer Moneylender Other Total
informal 0.1969 0.0464 0.0206 0.539 0.0114 0.0058 0.1731 0.0068 1
inf_herd 0.0131 0.0077 0 0.8644 0 0 0.1051 0.0096 1
formal 0.1571 0.0263 0.0083 0.7068 0.0055 0 0.0905 0.0055 1
Total 0.1523 0.0354 0.0145 0.6318 0.0082 0.0037 0.1469 0.0072 1
Key:  row proportions
TABLE 5.38 Source of investment and operating funds in last 12 months, by employment status
The source of finance, both for startup and
continuing operations varies considerably by the age
of the business. As demonstrated in Table 5.39, older
firms were more likely to get startup capital from family
and friends, but are more likely at present to use bank
financing. These facts along with some encouraging
trends in collateral requirements, discussed below,
suggest that there have been positive developments
in financing self-employed businesses in recent years.
It is important to remember however that those
borrowing for purposes other than startup constitute
a small portion of the self-employed firms. We discuss
the importance of credit constraints on the remaining
firms, below in Section 5.3 on the social and economic
consequences of informal activity.
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Table 5.41 presents loan size as a percent of
collateral requirements so a high number means lower
collateral requirements. These figures suggest that
collateral requirements are on the order of 2 to 3 times
the size of the loan. While this is common for
countries with commercial law institutions at the level
of development of Mongolia’s, it still places a inordinate
risk on the business borrower and points to the failure
of the financial system to fulfill its role as an
intermediary for diversification and spreading of risk.
Also note that collateral requirements appear to have
risen in the formal sector, but show either a decline
or stability in the non-herding informal sector.
Never Yes, before Yes, in Yes, in
status 2001 2001/2 2003/4 Total
informal 0.8105 0.0303 0.025 0.1341 1
inf_herd 0.891 0.0194 0.0146 0.075 1
formal 0.6544 0.0321 0.0487 0.2648 1
Total 0.8442 0.0249 0.0208 0.1101 1
Key:  row proportions
TABLE 5.40 Past borrowing experience, by employment status
TABLE 5.39 Source of finance by age of business
Question141
Age of
Business Family Friend   Moneylender Cooperative Bank Other Total
1.5 0.7185 0.0733 0.0842 0.0194 0.0721 0.0326 1
3 0.7578 0.0706 0.0713 0.0087   0.071 0.0206 1
5 0.7933 0.0505 0.0501 0.0174 0.0612 0.0275 1
9 0.8282 0.0397 0.0272 0.0149 0.0519 0.0381 1
80 0.8561 0.0226 0.0052 0.0035 0.0213 0.0913 1
Total 0.8128 0.0419 0.0336 0.0104 0.0452 0.0561 1
Key:  row proportions
                       Question146
Age of Family
business or friend Cooperative Pawnshop  Bank Supplier Customer Moneylender Other Total
1.5 .2137 .0618 .0257 .5248 .0059 .0039 .1558 .0085 1
3.0 .1696 .0298 .0318 .6418 0 0 .1271  0.0 1
5.0 .1442 .0353 .011 .5347 .0175 .0152 .2392 .0029 1
9.0 .1735 .0347 .0121 .615 .0082 0 .1485 .008 1
80 .0942 .0242 .003 .7811 .0067 0 .0775 .0134 1
Total .1525 .0354 .0145 .6314 .0082 .0037 .1471 .0072 1
Key:  row proportions
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Year of borrowing
status before 2001 2001/2002 2003/2004
inf_n_herd 43.7387 32.6525 40.9475
inf_herd 39.0447 35.2796 35.3053
formal 62.5321 41.2808 36.9984
Total 41.8424 34.4225 38.6747
TABLE 5.41 Loan size as percent of collateral
requirements, by year and employ-
ment status
Table 5.42 indicates that within the informal
sector collateral requirements fell in almost all sectors
where we can observe activity from 2001 to 2004.
The sole exceptions were transport, storage and
communications (9), and other community, social, and
personal activities (15). The highest collateral
requirements in the informal sector (lowest number
in Table 5.42) are associated with mining, although
we do not have time series data to identify trends in
this sector.
TABLE 5.42 Trends in loan size as percent of collateral requirements for non-herding informal sector, by
year and ISIC
ISIC   before 2001    2001/2002 2003/2004
Ag 33.0865 40.5803
Mining 26.1559
Manufact 34.616 29.5016 44.2032
Construction 30 30 39.6555
Trade 26.9576 32.7285 41.483
Hotel_Rest 50 31.0859 43.6439
Transport_Storage 41.4979 37.8039
Finance 45 57.8593
Real_Estate 37.4069
Educ
Health 50.4558
Other_Comm_Soc_Pers 39.9917 39.4215
Total 32.2665 33.3835 41.7037
Key:  row proportions
Dispute resolution
Table 5.43 and Table 5.44 allow us to investigate the
informal sector’s use of the country’s legal
infrastructure and institutions. We see in Table 5.43
that a large proportion of Mongolians (83 percent)
exhibit a willingness to make use of the court system
if other dispute resolution mechanisms have failed to
achieve a result. Table 5.44 shows that this willingness
is practically the same (79 percent) for those who
have previously gone to court to resolve a dispute,
although the skepticism about the efficacy of the
judicial system increases for this group. For example,
8 percent of those who have gone to court are
concerned that their opposing party could bribe the
court. Only 2 percent of those who have not gone to
court share this concern. In addition there is more
generalized mistrust of the court’s ability to reliably
serve justice among those with experience with 6
percent expressing this as a reason not to enter a
claim. Only 1.5 percent of those without court
experience share this view.
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TABLE 5.44 Willingness to take a non-complying party to court where substantial sums are at stake, by
past use of courts
   Yes     No, because…
Past
use of Defendant Court takes it costs courts too Don’t know
courts could bribe too long too much unreliable how Total
Yes 0.7927 0.0772 0.0195 0.0338 0.0603 0.0165 1
No 0.8336 0.0195 0.0194 0.0269 0.0148 0.0858 1
Total 0.8318 0.0221 0.0194 0.0272 0.0168 0.0827 1
Key:  row proportions
5.2 CAUSES OF INFORMAL SECTOR
PARTICIPATION
To understand the causes of shadow activity the
interaction of personal and business characteristics
and beliefs with the business environment are
examined. We find that both perceptions of
noncompliance and admissions of noncompliant
behavior are fairly substantial. Further, a large
majority of respondents believe that punishment for
noncompliance will not be severe. Among the small
group having had experience with the judicial system
for any reason, compliance with business registration
requirements is dramatically increased. The data
suggests, also, that registration in the formal sector is
driven, at least in part, by a desire to maintain banking
relationships. To the extent that financing is
increasingly available to informal sector businesses,
this motivation to register may be reduced. Our
discussion of results, below, focuses on three areas:
beliefs regarding government enforcement of
registration requirements, the impact of business
regulations, and  beliefs and behaviors regarding
corrupt activities including tax evasion. As will be seen,
there appears to be much ignorance regarding
compliance processes and consequences as well as
considerable regional variation in compliance and
beliefs.
Registration requirements
The business environment is shaped first by legal
processes associated with registration of business
entities. In addition to formal sector registration of
corporations, we consider beliefs and behaviors
associated with compliance with the Informal Sector
Tax Law, also known as the Patente Registry. Note
that the questions on beliefs were asked of all self-
employed respondents, so that informal sector actors
responded to questions regarding the implications of
noncompliance with formal sector requirements, and
the reverse was also the case.
Perceptions regarding the consequences of
TABLE 5.43 Willingness to take a non-complying party to court where substantial sums are at stake, by
employment status
Yes No, because…
Defendant Court takes it costs courts too Don’t know
  status could bribe too long too much unreliable how Total
Informal 0.828 0.0274 0.018 0.0392 0.0263 0.0612 1
Inf_herd 0.8307 0.0183 0.0187 0.0162 0.0059 0.1102 1
Formal 0.8756 0.0117 0.0379 0.0256 0.0376 0.0116 1
Total 0.8318 0.0221 0.0194 0.0272 0.0168 0.0827 1
Key:  row proportions
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TABLE 5.45 Perceived consequences of failing to register, by employment status
status 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
Informal .1952 .3843 .2565 .0868 .0223 .0202 .0034 .0235 .0057 .0021 1
Inf Herd .1715 .5911 .1613 .0292 .0062 .0087 .0000 .0308 .0012 .0000 1
Formal .0894 .1350 .4098 .2039 .0641 .0474 .0073 .0222 .0081 .0128 1
Total .1784 .4539 .2270 .0705 .0184 .0172 .0023 .0264 .0040 .0019 1
Legend :
1 = None
2 = Don’t know
3 = Don’t know, but there would probably be other consequences with a negative impact for running my business
4 = It would be harder to get a loan from a bank or credit cooperative
5 = I would not be able to use the court system to resolve business disputes
6 = I would receive a lower level of police protection
7 = It would be harder to import or export internationally
8 = I would not be eligible to benefit from any government programs
9 = It would be harder to receive municipal services such as access to piped water, gas, electricity, and garbage collection
10 =Other
Key:  row proportions
failing to register in the formal sector differ moderately
across the different statuses of businesses as shown
in Table 5.45. Ten percent of formal sector
respondents believe that there would be no negative
consequences for failing to register, while 19 percent
of informal firms believe this is the case.  While many
have an unclear idea of what the negative
consequences would be, the one of most concern,
particularly to formal sector respondents, is the loss
of ability to borrow funds.
TABLE 5.46 Perceived penalty if caught being unregistered, by employment status
None or Waste time/ Forced to
status could bribe Minor Serious Jail pay back tax Register Other Total
informal 0.0346 0.5936 0.0982 0.006 0.0548 0.1931 0.02 1
inf_herd 0.0766 0.7354 0.0759 0.008 0.0172 0.0702 0.0172 1
formal 0.0168 0.3221 0.1146 0.006 0.1587 0.3601 0.0223 1
Total 0.0543 0.6491 0.0881 0.007 0.0417 0.1414 0.0188 1
Key:  row proportions
Perceived penalties of discovered non-
compliance are shown in Table 5.46. Nine percent
overall, and 11 percent in the formal sector believe
that the enforcement mechanisms and penalties
implemented by the government will have serious
consequences for those failing to register for the
formal sector. Fifty-two percent of those in the formal
sector believe that they would be responsible for back
taxes if discovered (a combination of choices 5 and
6), while only 25 percent and 9 percent in the informal
and herding sector believe this is the case. In addition
to paying back taxes, a much larger percentage of
those in the formal sector believe that time lost
interacting with the government during enforcement
activities would be a significant consequence. A very
small proportion (less than 1 percent) thought that
time in jail was a likely consequence.
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TABLE 5.47 Would one be discovered if patente tax wasn’t paid but was owed, by employment status
Probably Don’t
status No Not know Probably Definitely Total
informal 0.0498 0.044 0.2353 0.2112 0.4597 1
inf_herd 0.0398 0.1804 0.3554 0.1091 0.3153 1
formal 0.0314 0.0167 0.0843 0.146 0.7217 1
Total 0.0439 0.1096 0.2864 0.1576 0.4024 1
Key:  row proportions
Probably Don’t
Location No Not know Probably Definitely Total
Ulaanbaa 0.0397 0.0437 0.2091 0.2564 0.4512 1
Aimag ce 0.0481 0.0403 0.2189 0.1919 0.5008 1
Soum cen 0.0615 0.0499 0.2375 0.1246 0.5264 1
Rural 0.04 0.1843 0.3637 0.1019 0.31 1
Total 0.0439 0.1096 0.2864 0.1576 0.4024 1
Key:  row proportions
TABLE 5.48 Would one be discovered if patente tax wasn’t paid but was owed, by location
 Probably Don’t
Region No Not know Probably Definitely Total
West 0.0642 0.4128 0.3154 0.0912 0.1164 1
Khangai 0.054 0.0741 0.4385 0.0769 0.3564 1
Central 0.0213 0.0092 0.1577 0.1981 0.6136 1
East 0.0277 0.0237 0.1933 0.2061 0.5492 1
Ulaanbaa 0.0397 0.0437 0.2091 0.2564 0.4512 1
Total 0.0439 0.1096 0.2864 0.1576 0.4024 1
Key:  row proportions
TABLE 5.49 Would one be discovered if patente tax wasn’t paid but was owed, by region
Beliefs regarding the probability of discovery
of non-compliance with the Informal Sector Law also
vary by employment status, as shown in Table 5.47.
The proportion of those believing that their evasion
of this law would probably or definitely be discovered
varies from a low of 43 percent for the herders to 86
percent among formal sector workers. Sixty-eight
percent of informal sector business workers share
this belief. Among this group of informal sector
business owners we also present results on location
(Table 5.48) and regional variability (Table 5.49) in
the belief regarding detection of patente law
noncompliance. Belief in the likelihood of detection
is relatively low in rural areas, and extremely low in
the western region where only 21 percent believe
noncompliance would probably or definitely be
discovered. By contrast, 81 percent share this belief
in the Central region.
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With regard to the consequences associated
with noncompliance with the Informal Sector Law,
we see in Table 5.50 that the results are broadly
similar to those for the business registry. There is
much ignorance about the consequences of
noncompliance, though a large proportion believes
there will be some unspecified negative consequence.
As previously, those in the formal sector express
much less ignorance about potential consequences.
With regard to the penalties associated with
noncompliance, the results shown in Table 5.51 are
broadly similar with those associated with formal
sector registry. Again the formal sector firms see the
costs associated with time spent dealing with the
government registration process as a much more
severe consequence than do those in the informal
sector.
TABLE 5.50 Perceived consequences if caught out of business registry, by employment status
status 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
Informal .1121 .3744 .3241 .0787 .0241 .0265 .0037 .0432 .0115 .0019 1
inf_herd .1672 .5085 .2029 .0358 .0033 .0066 .0000 .0752 .0000 .0000 1
formal .0651 .1807 .3862 .1554 .0836 .0467 .0144 .0452 .0167 .0060 1
Total .1367 .4302 .2678 .0617 .0170 .0178 .0024 .0590 .0063 .0012 1
Legend :
1 = None
2 = Don’t know
3 = Don’t know, but there would probably be other consequences with a negative impact for running my business
4 = It would be harder to get a loan from a bank or credit cooperative
5 = I would not be able to use the court system to resolve business disputes
6 = I would receive a lower level of police protection
7 = It would be harder to import or export internationally
8 = I would not be eligible to benefit from any government programs
9 = It would be harder to receive municipal services such as access to piped water, gas, electricity, and garbage collection
10 =Other
Key:  row proportions
TABLE 5.51 Perceived penalty if caught out of business registry, by employment status
None or Waste time/ Forced to
status could bribe Minor Serious Jail pay back tax Register Other Total
informal .0346 .5936 .0982 .0058 .0548 .1931 .0200 1
inf_herd .0766 .7354 .0759 .0076 .0172 .0702 .0172 1
formal .0168 .3221 .1146 .0055 .1587 .3601 .0223 1
Total .0543 .6491 .0881 .0067 .0417 .1414 .0188 1
Key:  row proportions
The next set of results compares beliefs with
behaviors.  To do this we restrict attention to those
who believed they were required to register under
the Informal Sector Law and divides the sample
according to whether the respondent acknowledged
compliance32.  As one would expect, Table 5.52
indicates that a larger share of those in compliance
thought that non-compliance would definitely be
32 All respondents were in either Treatment 2 or 4 in which the envelope technique made their answers to the Question 161 observable.
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TABLE 5.52 Would one be discovered if patente tax wasn’t paid but was owed, by whether respondent
declares she pays it
Did
respondent Probably Don’t
pay tax? No Not know Probably Definitely Total
No 0.0266 0.0145 0.3996 0.1638 0.3955 1
Yes 0.0152 0.0138 0.1946 0.2581 0.5183 1
Total 0.0204 0.0141 0.2887 0.2149 0.462 1
Key:  row proportions
Did re-
spondent
pay tax? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total
No .0899 .4843 .2182 .0924 .0142 .0152 .0000 .0759 .0100 1
Yes .1100 .3671 .3608 .0685 .0232 .0393 .0023 .0288 .0000 1
Total .1007 .4211 .2951 .0795 .0191 .0282 .0012 .0504 .0046 1
TABLE 5.53 What would be the penalty if patente tax wasn’t paid but was owed, by whether
respondent declares she pays it
Legend :
1 = None
2 = Don’t know
3 = Don’t know, but there would probably be other consequences with a negative impact for running my business
4 = It would be harder to get a loan from a bank or credit cooperative
5 = I would not be able to use the court system to resolve business disputes
6 = I would receive a lower level of police protection
7 = It would be harder to import or export internationally
8 = I would not be eligible to benefit from any government programs
9 = It would be harder to receive municipal services such as access to piped water, gas, electricity, and garbage collection
Key:  row proportions
detected (52 percent versus 40 percent of those who
were not registered). An even larger difference
between the two groups—and one with more
implications for policy—is the much larger admission
of ignorance with regard to both probability of
detection and the consequences of non-registration.
Across these dimensions 40 percent of the
noncompliant group admitted ignorance regarding the
probability of detection, compared to 20 percent of
the compliant informal sector responders. Table 5.53
indicates relatively similar views regarding the
consequences, with large shares of both compliant
and non-compliant respondents admitting ignorance
about penalties. Perhaps most damning is the
evidence in Table 5.54, which suggests that even if a
patente tax were owed, two-thirds of the of the
respondents thought that little would happen if it
weren’t paid—and this result is independent of
whether the respondent is paying her tax.
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Did re-
spondent None or Waste time/ Forced to
pay tax? could bribe Minor Serious Jail pay back tax Register Other Total
No 0.0033 0.6672 0.056 0.0383 0.0493 0.1789 0.0071 1
Yes 0.0159 0.6701 0.0881 0.0126 0.0225 0.1907 0 1
Total 0.0101 0.6688 0.0733 0.0244 0.0349 0.1853 0.0033 1
Key:  row proportions
TABLE 5.54 Perceived penalty if patente tax wasn’t paid but was owed, by whether respondent
declares she pays it
Regulation
Table 5.55 suggests that the perception that regulation
is a burden increases with the formality of the
enterprise. Only 2 percent of herders are affected,
but 18 percent of the informal sector and 34 percent
of the formal sector feel that governmental
regulations, procedures, and other rules are obstacles
for their business operation.  The perception of the
size of the problem is similar in the informal and formal
sectors; with the affected groups estimating, on
average, that profits would be 24 percent higher
without the obstacles.
TABLE 5.55 Perceptions of burdensome regula-
tion, by employment status
status Yes No Total
informal 0.1819 0.8181 1
inf_herd 0.0226 0.9774 1
formal 0.3359 0.6641 1
Total 0.1116 0.8884 1
Key:  row proportions
The distribution of regulatory concerns varies
across the formal and informal sectors, as seen in
Table 5.56. While sector specific regulations are
paramount for both groups, they are the primary
concern for 41 percent in the formal sector but only
24 percent in the informal sector.  After the sector
TABLE 5.56 Perceived main regulatory obstacle to respondent’s business,
by non-herder employment status
Operating Business Real
Sector- /Construc- registry estate Environ- Other Total
status Trade Labor specific tion permit permit transact. ment
informal .1803 .1802 .2386 .1052 .1331 .0477 .0648 .0500 1
formal .0988 .1128 .4072 .1255 .1732 .0106 .0185 .0534 1
Total .1661 .1685 .2680 .1087 .1401 .0412 .0568 .0506 1
Key:  row proportions
specific regulations the primary concern in the
informal sector is for customs and foreign trade
regulations and labor regulations (18 percent each).
Formal sector firms are more concerned with permits
to open a business (17 percent) and permits for
construction and business operation (13 percent).
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Given the importance of sector specific
regulations, in Table 5.57 we investigate by ISIC which
sectors report regulatory obstacles, taking particular
notice of sectors in which obstacles are high in the
formal sector and low in the informal. The sectors
which show the greatest degree of difference in this
regard are manufacturing and construction, with 8
percent of informal and 31 percent of formal
manufacturers reporting regulatory obstacles. In the
construction sector, again 8 percent of the informal
firms report regulatory obstacles, while 55 percent of
formal sector firms do. Trade and transportation are
two other sectors with large informal components that
share this pattern of higher obstacles in the formal
sector although the differences are not as great. In
the trade sector 23 percent of informal enterprises
report obstacles and 34 percent of formal enterprises
do. In the transportation sector 22 percent of the
informal enterprises report problems and 40 percent
of the formal enterprises do.
TABLE 5.57 Perceived main regulatory obstacle to respondent’s business, by non-herder employment
status and ISIC
Non-herding Informal Sector Formal Sector
ISIC Yes No Total ISIC Yes No Total
Ag .1660 .8340 1 Ag .1091 .8909 1
Fishing 0 1 1 Mining .3810 .6190 1
Mining .2105 .7895 1 Manufact .3068 .6932 1
Manufact .0762 .9238 1 Elec_gas 0 1 1
Elec_gas .0509 .9491 1 Construc .5499 .4501 1
Construc .0753 .9247 1 Trade .3346 .6654 1
Trade .2246 .7754 1 Hotel_Re .4298 .5702 1
Hotel_Re .1994 .8006 1 Transpor .4030 .5970 1
Transpor .2178 .7822 1 Finance .2941 .7059 1
Finance .2820 .7180 1 Real_Est .3804 .6196 1
Real_Est .1211 .8789 1 Educ .4011 .5989 1
Educ .1715 .8285 1 Health .3959 .6041 1
Health .2064 .7936 1 Other_Co .2726 .7274 1
Other_Co .1567 .8433 1 Total .3359 .6641 1
Priv_hou 0 1 1
Total .1819 .8181 1 Key:  row proportions
Key:  row proportions
Corruption and tax evasion: perception and
behaviors33
Large proportions of the population believe that
corruption (Table 5.58) and tax evasion (Table 5.59)
are prevalent in Mongolia. Herders differ greatly from
the rest of the population perceiving much less
corruption, although even in this group more than
half (53 percent) believe corruption is considerable
or widespread. The proportion among other self-
33 Note that this section includes responses from wage earners and the unemployed whenever possible.  These groups were excluded
from previous questions on the business environment.
employed business owners and wage earners is about
80 percent, however. The unemployed are between
these extremes with 66 percent reporting beliefs that
high levels of corruption exist. Differences in
perceptions across groups regarding tax evasion are
similar, although the perceived levels are lower than
for corruption, averaging 50 percent and ranging form
30 percent (herders) to 64 percent (formal sector
business owners).
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TABLE 5.58 Perceptions of the degree corruption is widespread in the country as a whole, by employ-
ment status
status2 None Little Somewhat Considerable Widespread Total
informal 0.019 0.0862 0.1079 0.2177 0.5693 1
inf_herd 0.1266 0.1763 0.1749 0.1933 0.3288 1
formal 0.0364 0.0627 0.0564 0.2481 0.5964 1
wage 0.0228 0.0821 0.1005 0.3094 0.4852 1
unemp 0.065 0.1328 0.1443 0.2354 0.4225 1
Total 0.0554 0.1148 0.1272 0.2449 0.4577 1
Key:  row proportions
Not at Don’t Strongly
status2 all think so Not sure Think so think so Total
informal 0.0615 0.1223 0.2211 0.322 0.273 1
inf_herd 0.2471 0.1707 0.2796 0.202 0.1007 1
formal 0.065 0.1396 0.1554 0.3537 0.2863 1
wage 0.0584 0.1216 0.2117 0.3818 0.2265 1
unemp 0.1528 0.1398 0.2855 0.2698 0.1522 1
Total 0.1226 0.1376 0.2423 0.3031 0.1945 1
Key:  row proportions
TABLE 5.59 Perceptions that tax evasion is widespread in the country as a whole, by employment status
Corrupt behaviors and evasion are highly
correlated with the respondents’ views on the impact
of regulation, as seen in the panels of Table 5.60. For
customs bribes (q158) the rate of activity is more
than four times greater among those who
acknowledge that regulatory burdens are onerous (39
percent versus 9 percent). Bribe-paying in general
(q162) shows a similar effect with 32 percent
admitting bribes among those who find regulations
an obstacle compared to 19 percent among those who
do not.  A follow-up question to the bribery question
on “gift-giving” shows the same pattern and also a
larger proportion admitting this behavior (27 percent
and 8 percent).  Tax compliance is an anomaly with a
slightly larger share of compliance among those who
acknowledge regulatory obstacles (70 percent versus
62 percent).  These results are take from the two-
question method treatments, which showed the
greatest admission of corrupt behaviors.
TABLE 5.60 Relationship between undertaking a corrupt act and believing regulation is onerous
Are regulations Have you paid a bribe to
Onerous? to reduce customs taxes?
No Yes Total No Yes Total
Yes 0.6058 0.3942 1 Yes 0.7432 0.2568 1
No 0.9121 0.0879 1 No 0.9215 0.0785 1
Total 0.8559 0.1441 1 Total 0.8894 0.1106 1
Key:  row proportions Key:  row proportions
Are regulations Have you given a gift to
Onerous? to government official?
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From Table 5.62, the impact of credit constraints
on the informal sector can be seen in both the present
circumstances and future prospects of constrained
individuals. The annualized value added of informal
sector businesses who indicate no need for loans
exceeds those have no collateral by 20 percent.
Several groups of respondents indicate value added
that exceeds those who report being unconstrained.
This suggests that there are diverse set of constraints
operating for firms of different size. In particular, the
group with the highest average value added is
constrained by the level of interest rates.
5.3 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
OF INFORMALITY
We have observed some of the impacts that
participation in the informal sector shadow can have
when identifying business characteristics in Section
5.1. In general those in the informal sector are smaller
firms, with less productive workers, and significantly
fewer concerns with regulatory burdens. In this
section we investigate three critical issues associated
with participation in the informal sector, associated
with finance, well being and poverty, and the durability
of informal participation.
Access to finance
Table 5.61 presents a view into the extent to which
business owners have access to credit. The large
majority of the population (85 percent) did not use
bank loans for investment. The unmet need for loans
was greatest in the informal sector (46 percent) with
respondents indicating constraints associated with
collateral requirements (27 percent), information (10
percent), and interest rates (7 percent) the most
pressing concern. The figures presented for collateral
are the sum of the responses that collateral
requirements are too high, or that the business does
not have sufficient collateral. In the herding sector
the lack of information dominated the concerns of
those (18 percent) who had a need for additional
capital.  In the formal sector, collateral requirements
(20 percent) and interest rates (15 percent) were the
main concerns.
TABLE 5.61 Reason for not borrowing from a bank, by employment status
Employment Never I don’t No col- Collateral No tax No High
status needed to know how lateral too high returns accounts   interest Other Total
informal .5440 .1003 .1934 .0820 .0024 .0054 .0687 .0039 1
inf_herd .7049 .1799 .0635 .0236 .0004 .0025 .0247 .0005 1
formal .6165 .0269 .0997 .0965 .0000 .0044 .1524 .0035 1
Total .6325 .1400 .1207 .0513 .0012 .0038 .0483 .0021 1
Key:  row proportions
Are regulations Have you paid a bribe to
Onerous? a government official?
No Yes Total No Yes Total
Yes 0.68 0.32 1 Yes 0.3012 0.6988 1
No 0.8057 0.1943 1 No 0.3809 0.6191 1
Total 0.7856 0.2134 1 Total 0.3665 0.6335 1
Key:  row proportions          Key:  row proportions
Are regulations Did you cheat
Onerous? on your taxes last year?
TABLE 5.60 continied
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TABLE 5.62 Annualized gross value added for non-herder informals, by reason for not borrowing from a
bank (Togrogs)
Reason for not
Borrowing Estimate Std. Err.                [95% Conf. Interval] Deff
No_need 2462811 537471.6 1409083 3516538 8.393145
I_don’t_how 3254682 1066934 1162929 5346435 11.96088
No_collatoral 2054669 134423.5 1791128 2318210 1.163809
Collateral high 2195917 766293.2 693578 3698255 1.211481
No_tax_returns 3669469 999229.3 1710453 5628485 1.125073
No_account recs 2805757 832182 1174242 4437273 0.925691
High_interest 3878612 643837.2 2616352 5140872 1.126792
Other 1886879 814698 289641.6 3484117 1.198243
With regard to future prospects, Table 5.63
indicates that 77 percent of the group without credit
constraints believes growth prospects for their
businesses are positive in the next three years, with
16 percent predicting stagnation and only 8 percent a
decline.  Those constrained due to lack of collateral or
lack of tax records are less optimistic, with 57 and 55
percent believing prospects are positive, respectively.
Those without tax records are by far the most
pessimistic, with thirty-one percent believing that
business growth will be negative in the next three
years, a contrast with the consensus estimate of 9
percent.
Reason for                        Business prospects
not borrowing
from bank Decline Stagnant Growth Total
No need 0.077 0.1579 0.765 1
I don’t know how 0.0758 0.2331 0.6911 1
No collateral 0.1268 0.3033 0.5698 1
Collateral Too high 0.1638 0.1992 0.6369 1
No tax records 0.3067 0.1467 0.5466 1
No written accounts 0.146 0.0564 0.7976 1
High interest rates 0.092 0.201 0.7069 1
Other 0.3251 0.331 0.3439 1
Total 0.089 0.1904 0.7206 1
Key:  row proportions
TABLE 5.63 Self-declared business growth prospects, by reason for not borrowing from a bank
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The figures in the bottom right corner of the
table shows that the mean income per capita does
exceed the minimum standard at the national level,
though just barely. Reported income is 23,458 togrogs
and the weighted national average figure for minimum
living standards is 22,118 togrogs. The unemployed
and herding sectors on the whole do not achieve this
level, with the unemployed on average at 39 percent
and the herding sector at 82 percent of the minimum
standard. Wage earners (128 percent), informal
Constraints due to lack of collateral are
particularly severe in the non-herding agriculture
sector with 30 percent constrained for this reason.
Lack of collateral is also severe in mining and
manufacturing sectors where 28 percent and 23
percent cite this issue. The hotel and restaurant sector
is also relatively constrained with the lack of collateral
(16 percent) and high interest rates (15 percent) the
primary causes.
Income, assets and poverty
One of the critical issues associated with informal
sector activity is its contribution to the well-being of
household members. We next assess the contribution
of the informal sector to household income and to its
assets.
First, in Table 5.64 we examine the contribution
of the informal sector and compare income levels to
the minimum per capita living standards for the
country developed by the NSO. The table below
presents three numbers for each region and
household status. The first is the annual household
income, the second the mean monthly household
income per person, and the third the NSO minimum
living standard per person per month.  Notice that
the NSO standards vary by region.
TABLE 5.64 Annual household income, monthly per capita income and monthly poverty line, by region
and employment status (Togrogs)
region    informal inf_herd formal wage unemp Total
West 874,460 486,764 1,166,772 1,207,437 254,037 750,770
19,797 10,118 21,051 26,240 5,541 16,262
20,200 20,200 20,200 20,200 20,200 20,200
Khangai 1,019,558 687,135 2,282,220 1,799,410 260,638 1,018,159
22,542 12,698 47,826 34,072 7,713 20,279
20,600 20,600 20,600 20,600 20,600 20,600
Central 1,195,244 1,254,313 1,229,450 1,320,473 280,654 1,104,405
25,028 29,761 24,107 28,089 6,930 24,204
20,600 20,600 20,600 20,600 20,600 20,600
East 3,845,717 889,479 1,124,935 195,495 1,145,571
49,350 21,908 23,558 6,131 22,698
21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200 21,200
Ulaanbaatar 2,042,721 1,947,525 2,866,844 1,011,102 439,836 1,396,081
43,240 35,164 53,875 23,780 12,057 30,515
26,500 26,500 26,500 26,500 26,500 26,500
Total 1,576,394 800,459 2,241,811 1,345,623 325,193 1,105,847
33,010 16,925 43,804 28,163 8,765 23,458
23,371 20,662 23,093 21,960 22,664 22,118
Note: Income information derives from the Envelope Method of elicitation (see Section 2.2)
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TABLE 5.65 Annual household income, monthly per capita income and monthly poverty line, by location
and employment status (Togrogs)
Location informal inf_herd formal wage unemp Total
Ulaanbaatar 2,042,721 1,947,525 2,866,844 1,011,102 439,836 1,396,081
43,240 35,164 53,875 23,780 12,057 30,515
26,500 26,500 26,500 26,500 26,500 26,500
Aimag center 1,310,331 716,046 2,377,582 2,396,856 381,759 1,495,245
29,251 14,334 55,802 45,490 10,595 31,011
20,560 20,772 20,551 20,536 20,566 20,559
Soum center 1,170,220 966,839 418,034 1,117,929 169,920 881,270
19,575 18,730 7,446 24,560 4,427 18,534
20,528 20,580 20,554 20,580 20,599 20,577
Rural 313,865 773,728 2,474,339 562,699 345,542 755,568
7,079 16,582 42,357 9,956 5,157 15,838
20,397 20,563 20,600 20,494 20,316 20,546
Total 1,576,394 800,459 2,241,811 1,345,623 325,193 1,105,847
33,010 16,925 43,804 28,163 8,765 23,458
23,371 20,662 23,093 21,960 22,664 22,118
Note: Income information derives from the Envelope Method of elicitation (see Section 2.2).
households (141 percent) and formal sector
households (190 percent) exceed this threshold.  In
Table 5.65 the same data sorted by location indicates
that while households with formal sector firms exceed
the minimum standards in all locations informal sector
firms do so only in the aimag centers and in
Ulaanbaatar.
Turning to assets, we divide these into two types,
animal and plant/equipment (non-animal). Table 5.66
presents the balance sheet, the declared assets
(q119) and liabilities (q120) of respondents. Here,
again, the Envelope Treatment (Env) reveals
significantly more assets than the Multiplier
Treatment, with the difference more extreme among
the herding households. Interestingly, liabilities are
an anomaly when considering treatment effects; they
are much higher for the herders in the multiplier
treatment. This result implies that one should consider
the possibility that strategic responses are driving the
difference between envelope and multiplier questions,
and that individuals may behave more strategically in
the Multiplier Treatment. Animal assets are for both
herders and non-herder informal sector businesses
in Table 5.67.
70 THE SIZE AND CHARACTER OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR AND
 ITS SHADOW ECONOMY IN MONGOLIA
5 CHAPTER POLICY ISSUES
TABLE 5.66 Balance sheet of assets and liabilities, by employment status
Total Subpop. Estimate Std. Err.           [95% Conf. Interval] Deff
Assets
Envelop Informal 7.86E+10 1.30E+10 5.30E+10 1.04E+11 0.4233722
Multuplier Informal 1.20E+11 8.34E+09 1.04E+11 1.36E+11 0.6972588
Envelop  Herding 1.42E+11 4.90E+10 4.59E+10 2.38E+11 6.119897
Multiplier Herding 1.11E+11 1.70E+10 7.80E+10 1.45E+11 7.372394
Liabilities
Envelop Informal 8.88E+09 2.94E+09 3.11E+09 1.47E+10 0.4967668
Multiplier Informal 1.20E+10 1.48E+09 9.08E+09 1.49E+10 0.7671556
Envelop Herding 3.22E+08 2.21E+08 -1.12E+08 7.56E+08 5.142009
Multiplier Herding 4.28E+09 2.07E+09 2.18E+08 8.34E+09 7.741012
Status Average size Total for status
informal 13 1.640.144
inf_herd 167 23.171.692
formal 50 746.161
wage 17 3.179.243
unemp 12 1.241.466
Total 53 29.978.706
TABLE 5.67 Herd size, by employment status
Foreign remittances
The figures on household income reported above
include income from all sources. Here we examine
more closely a component of household income—
that derived from foreign remittances. Survey
estimates imply that only a small number of
households (12,497 or 2.2 percent) have income from
foreign remittances, but among those who do have
this source of income it represents an important share,
on average 31 percent of the total. As shown in Table
5.68 remittances are extremely important among the
unemployed with recipients reporting the value of
foreign remittances as 48 percent of the annual
household income. The large share among the
unemployed is not due to larger remittances but to
lower household incomes. In fact, the mean value of
annual remittances for the unemployed, at 344,850
togrogs is the lowest of all employment statuses.  The
share of households receiving remittances and the
mean value of remittance received is lowest in the
herding sector (0.9 percent); however, the herding
sector reports the largest value of remittances at
609,380 togrogs. The formal sector has the highest
rate of remittance receipt at 5.2 percent, and a value
that is second to the herders at 565,487 togrogs.
Households receiving remittances on average report
income 277,641 togrogs greater than those without
remittances, a difference that is not statistically
significant.
Table 5.69 and Table 5.70 reveal the variability
in remittances by region and location. Note that the
bulk of the households receiving remittances are in
Ulaanbaatar, with very few in the west and in general
in rural areas. With the exception of a small number
of households in the West, the bulk of the value of
remittances goes mostly to households in Ulaanbaatar
and the aimag centers, with very little in the soums,
rural areas, and in particular little to the Eastern Region.
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Percent
Status Value of income N(households)
informal 457.477 26 2.948
inf_herd 609.380 14 1.261
formal 565.487 25 777
wage 392.395 26 4.317
unemp 344.850 48 3.193
Total 428.263 31 12.497
Remittance value is in togrogs; remittance share is percent
of household income as foreign remittances. N(households)
is the number of households receiving foreign remittances.
Percent
Status Value of income N(households)
West 1,026,079 29 732
Khangai 276,515 29 2,693
Central 228,666 24 934
East 57,379 13 868
Ulaanbaatar 494,177 34 7,269
Total 428,263 31 12,497
See notes for Table 5.70.
TABLE 5.68 Foreign remittances, by employment
status (annual)
TABLE 5.69 Foreign remittances, by region
(annual)
TABLE 5.70 Foreign remittance, by location
(annual)
Durability and hysteretic change
The economic consequences of the informal sector
shadow also depend on the extent to which there is
exit and entry from the sector. Do people acquire
skills in this sector that enable them to be more
productive elsewhere? We find little evidence for this
conjecture given the results presented in Table 5.71.
Household incomes among the wage earning group
are substantially lower at present for those who
previously had informal self-employment income as
compared to those who never participated in this
sector. Nevertheless we observe, in Table 5.72 we
observe frustrated entry into self-employment from
among wage earners, with credit constraints
mentioned by 49 percent as the reason for not
entering the sector. It appears that 31 percent are
satisfied with their wage earning and have no desire
to enter self-employment.
       Percent
Status Value of income N(households)
Ulaanbaatar 494,177 34 7,269
Aimag center 563,162 31 1,544
Soum center 322,850 29 2,675
Rural 26,362 8 1,009
Total 428,263 31 12,497
See notes for Table 5.70.
TABLE 5.71 Wage earner annual household income, by whether anyone in household has had self-
employment income since 2001 (Togrogs)
Any self-
employment
income since 2001 Estimate Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]             Deff
Previous 1108051 132136.7 849038.9 1367063 0.833752
Never 1508464 112165.7 1288599 1728329 1.055862
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Among those who maintain informal self-
employment businesses we find evidence in Table
5.73 that behavior changes depending on the length
of time in the informal sector. Compliance with the
requirements of the Informal Sector Law through
registry and payment of the patente, for example
declines fairly consistently with the number of years
in the informal sector. Those in the quintile of shortest
duration of self-employment (1.5 years or less) admit
a 67 percent compliance rate, which falls to 38 percent
for those with more than nine years in the sector.
This behavior indicates a diminishing concern with
compliance and with relationships with officials among
the most experienced of the informal sector self-
employed.
TABLE 5.72 Wage earner reason for no current self-employment income
Have Can’t Taxes Don’t
fulltime raise too have Family
status2 job the funds high skills duties Other Total
Wage 0.3124 0.4925 0.035 0.055 0.0801 0.025 1
Years in
Current Owed and paid
business      patente last month
No Yes Total
1.5 0.3273 0.6727 1
3 0.3769 0.6231 1
5 0.3416 0.6584 1
9 0.4702 0.5298 1
60 0.623 0.377 1
Total 0.4195 0.5805 1
Key:  row proportions
Each row represents 20 percent of businesses with the
“Years in informal business” representing the upper range of
a category that represents 20 percent of the business
population.
Table 5.73 Relation between patente tax
compliance and years in current
informal business activity
Example of the multivariate approach: the
relative cause of informal participation
In this final section of Chapter 5 we present an example
of the sort of multivariate statistical analysis possible
with the survey data.  It is different from the
descriptive statistics used in this report up to this point
in that it simultaneously takes into account several
sources of variation and permits their relative
importance to be more rigorously compared.
In the present example, we use a multivariate
probit model to investigate the differences between
formal sector and informal sector self-employed
business owners. The model generates a predicted
probability of being in the informal sector based on
the location and sector of the business and on
personal and household characteristics. Many of the
results discussed previously in the presentation of
tables that compared personal characteristics across
employment status carry through to this analysis. The
power of this approach is greater, however, since we
can observe the impact of each variable of interest,
while holding the value of all other variables constant.
The results should be interpreted with caution.  There
has been no attempt to address issues associated with
the direction of causality of effects, which requires
multi-equation modeling. For example, by one
measure we find that trustworthy people are more
likely to be in the formal sector. The results here
cannot identify whether trustworthy people sort
themselves into the sector or whether they become
more trustworthy as a result of their participation in
the formal sector.
In the model itself, dummy variables, with the
value of either 1 or 0 are inserted for each region,
location, and sector in order to measure their different
effects. To estimate the model one of each of the
dummy variables is dropped and the dropped value
becomes the region, location, and sector to which
the others are compared. In this model, rural
agriculture in the west is the baseline to which others
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are compared.34 Characteristics and attitudes that are
in the model include gender, age (q17age), education
(q20), household size (q25), patience (q30 and q36),
trust (q31), trustworthiness (q39), fairness (q35),
trust in government (q40), a measure of unfair
treatment by a government official (q41), and risk
(q44). We also include dummy variables regarding
attitudes towards enforcement of business
registration requirements (q137). This question has
7 possible responses and response 1 (“no negative
consequences of non-registration, I could pay a bribe
and solve the problem”) serves as the baseline for
this question.   Additional questions on perceptions of
regulatory obstacles (q148), and perceptions
regarding the extent of corruption (q155) and tax
evasion (q156) are also included.
The results of the estimation are presented in
Table 5.74.  The information of primary interest is in
the column labeled delta Prob which identifies the
marginal change in the probability of being in the
informal sector with a change in the variable identified
in Column 1.35 A positive delta Prob implies a greater
likelihood of being in the informal sector. Both the
size of the marginal effect and its statistical significance
are important in understanding the results. To assess
the statistical significance we consider those variables
in which the p-value, identified by the column P>|z|, is
less than 0.10 to identify effects that are not due to
statistical noise.   Thus, for example, the age variable
q17age is significant (p=0.076), but the effect is small.
A change in age changes the probability of being in
the informal sector by -0.06 percent indicating that
there is a small effect with younger workers more
likely to be informal sector business owners.  By
contrast, the gender variable (coded as male=1 and
female=0) has a statistically insignificant (p-value of
0.137) marginal effect of 1.04 percent, leading us to
conclude that there are no gender differences in
shadow participation after controlling for other
influences.
The largest impact on the likelihood of informal
participation is associated with perceptions regarding
consequences of non-registration. Recall that the
baseline for this response is that there would be no
negative consequences aside from the need to pay a
bribe. Those responding (3), (5), and (6) to this
question are much more likely to be in the formal
sector with marginal effects of -10.20 percent, -15.62
percent, and -8.62 percent, respectively, and all with
strongly significant p-values. These responses are
associated with costs due to noncompliance that are
either uncertain but high (3), with bureaucratic
inefficiency (5), and the need to pay back taxes (6).
Among the personal characteristics education
(q20) and trustworthiness (q39b) have the largest
effects of variables that are statistically significant. For
both, higher levels are associated with participation
in the formal sector.  The perception of unfair
treatment by a government official (q41) is also
strongly associated with formal sector participation.
These variable have smaller effects than the
enforcement question (-2.57 percent for q20, -2.30
percent for q39b, and -2.63 percent for q41) but sill
have an important impact on behavior. The perception
of regulatory obstacles is also important. Here, those
perceiving regulations to be significant obstacles are
2.8 percent more likely to be in the informal sector
than those not perceiving regulations to be so.
There are some significant regional and sectoral
effects as well, with the Khangai (-4.18 percent) and
Central (-3.11 percent) regions more likely to be
formal, and the East Region (5.97 percent) less formal.
Ulaanbaatar is not significantly different than the
baseline, which we took as the Western Region
(p=0.30).
Now we turn to the influence of the economic
sector in the decision to be informal. For this, we use
the agricultural sector as the comparison. Of the
larger sectors, manufacturing (Sector 4) and transport
(Sector 9) show significantly more formality than the
agricultural sector (4.30 percent and 4.59 percent,
respectively) although the largest sector, trade
(Sector 7), is not significantly different from agriculture
(p=0.287). Hotels and restaurants (Sector 8) are more
formal than agriculture (-4.54 percent). Finally, several
of the smaller sectors, including finance, education,
and health are, unsurprisingly, substantially more
likely to be in the formal sector than agriculture as
well (-12.79 percent, -12.84 percent, and -18.43
percent, respectively).
34 With regard to locations, Ulaanbaatar (Location 1) is dropped along with the rural (Location 4) because it is already included as a
region (Region 5).
35 The marginal effects are calculated at the mean of the value of the variable, these values are in the column x-bar in the table of
results.
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Probit estimates  Number of obs =   6318
LR chi2(40)   = 662.68
Prob > chi2   = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -1794.5266 Pseudo R2     = 0.1559
shadow2 delta Prob         Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar                 [    95% C.I.   ]
gender* 0.0103859 0.0069841 1.49 0.137 0.50918 -0.003303 0.024074
q17age -0.0005919 0.0003336 -1.77 0.076 39.7395 -0.001246 0.000062
q20 -0.0257137 0.0022578 -11.35 0 4.61048 -0.030139 -0.02129
q25 -0.0003224 0.0021867 -0.15 0.883 4.41722 -0.004608 0.003963
q30 -0.0122474 0.0030134 -4.06 0 2.65369 -0.018154 -0.00634
q31 -0.0018129 0.0044272 -0.41 0.682 1.94302 -0.01049 0.006864
q33 0.0072829 0.0046116 1.58 0.114 2.71921 -0.001756 0.016321
q35 0.0076088 0.0069116 1.1 0.271 1.47657 -0.005938 0.021155
q36 0.0007979 0.0004203 1.9 0.058 9.67569 -0.000026 0.001622
q39b* -0.0229277 0.0072715 -2.96 0.003 0.753245 -0.03718 -0.00868
q40 -0.003819 0.0033222 -1.15 0.251 3.43906 -0.01033 0.002692
q41 -0.0263176 0.0049345 -5.33 0 1.42039 -0.035989 -0.01665
q44 -2.14E-06 1.32E-06 -1.62 0.106 1807.07 -4.70E-06 4.50E-07
_Iq137_2* -0.0231716 0.0216261 -1.06 0.291 0.563944 -0.065558 0.019215
_Iq137_3* -0.102005 0.0404939 -3.19 0.001 0.092909 -0.181371 -0.02264
_Iq137_4* -0.041845 0.0713811 -0.68 0.494 0.006648 -0.181749 0.098059
_Iq137_5* -0.1561566 0.0480348 -4.37 0 0.072175 -0.250303 -0.06201
_Iq137_6* -0.0872593 0.0332851 -3.13 0.002 0.207186 -0.152497 -0.02202
_Iq137_7* -0.04861 0.0459582 -1.25 0.212 0.019152 -0.138686 0.041466
q148 0.0285538 0.0077724 3.68 0 1.80073 0.01332 0.043787
q155 -0.0012807 0.0035477 -0.36 0.718 4.26242 -0.008234 0.005673
q156 0.0054081 0.0030138 1.79 0.073 3.67854 -0.000499 0.011315
_Iregi~2* -0.0417587 0.0153167 -3.02 0.003 0.216049 -0.071779 -0.01174
_Iregi~3* -0.0311075 0.0160931 -2.12 0.034 0.154004 -0.06265 0.000434
_Iregi~4* 0.0597119 0.0099069 3.36 0.001 0.04416 0.040295 0.079129
_Iregi~5* 0.0396875 0.0382784 1.03 0.303 0.468186 -0.035337 0.114712
_Iloca~2* 0.0514993 0.0359014 1.41 0.159 0.440013 -0.018866 0.121865
_Iloca~3* 0.0436495 0.0232569 1.43 0.153 0.084362 -0.001933 0.089232
_Isec~_3* 0.0398966 0.0270329 1.07 0.285 0.006964 -0.013087 0.09288
_Isec~_4* 0.0429267 0.0125999 2.84 0.005 0.176638 0.018231 0.067622
_Isec~_5* -0.0429917 0.0897777 -0.56 0.575 0.002374 -0.218953 0.132969
_Isec~_6* 0.021471 0.0210012 0.9 0.369 0.023583 -0.01969 0.062633
_Isect~7* 0.0172487 0.0162658 1.07 0.287 0.520734 -0.014632 0.049129
_Isect~8* -0.0453994 0.0278379 -1.9 0.057 0.043526 -0.099961 0.009162
_Isect~9* 0.0458564 0.0118277 2.98 0.003 0.112219 0.022675 0.069038
_Isec~10* -0.1278727 0.0664144 -2.59 0.01 0.006015 -0.258043 0.002297
_Isec~11* -0.0113675 0.0324756 -0.37 0.712 0.012504 -0.075018 0.052283
_Isec~13* -0.1283704 0.078915 -2.19 0.029 0.003957 -0.283041 0.0263
_Isec~14* -0.1843417 0.0699129 -3.69 0 0.007756 -0.321368 -0.04732
_Isec~15* -0.0136218 0.02416 -0.6 0.55 0.040203 -0.060975 0.033731
obs. P 0.8947452
pred. P 0.9254726 (at x-bar)
(*) delta Prob is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
    z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
TABLE 5.74  Probit results on informal participation
77THE SIZE AND CHARACTER OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR AND
 ITS SHADOW ECONOMY IN MONGOLIA
6 CHAPTERWHAT WAS LEARNEAD
e are now in a position to summarize what we
have now learned about the informal sector
and its components as well as what still remains to be
done with the wealth of information collected in the
household survey. We then end by suggesting next
steps in implementing the remediation plan (also
developed in the current project) so as to ensure the
sustainability and comprehensiveness of the NSO’s
efforts to measure shadow economic activity in
Mongolia on a regular and cost-effective basis.
6.1 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Results can be summarized according to (i)
measurement and distribution, (ii) informal sector
characteristics, (iii) causes and consequences and (iv)
treatment effects. Recall that we break the informal
sector into two parts, a herding sector (ISIC 012) and
all other sectors.
Also recall that while the discussion and tables
of the previous sections create a rich picture of the
informal sector, two caveats are in order. First, what
emerges is primarily a descriptive picture based on
bivariate correlations (relationships between two
characteristics).  In order to generate a more insightful
and precise understanding additional multivariate
analysis is recommended. Second, the results need
to be interpreted in light of the various elicitation
methods used in the survey and these still remain to
be synthesized. Until then, conclusions must remain
tentative since each elicitation method generates
different statistics, especially concerning those issues
involving the “sensitive” (potentially incriminating)
questions. Rectifying both is discussed in Section 6.2,
below.
Measurement and distribution
The NSO’s preliminary estimate of GDP for 2004 is
1,807 billion togrogs. Of this amount we estimate from
NSO data that 259 billion togrogs or 14.34 percent of
the formal activity is associated with earlier attempts
to measure the informal sector shadow economy
(Bikales et al. 2000). Mean estimates from the ISHS
suggest that a better estimate of the informal sector
shadow, not including the animal herding sector, is
What was learned
24 percent (multiplier method) or 30 percent
(envelope method). This expansion in the informal
sector shadow arises for both economic and statistical
reasons. The evidence suggests growth in several
sectors including the trade sector, relative to overall
GDP growth. In addition, the ISHS covers additional
sectors with the most significant being manufacturing.
The ISHS yielded results with relatively wide
confidence bands due to the existence within the
sample of a small number of firms with extremely
large value added. Our analysis suggests that these
firms do exist in the population and that the results
were not due to errors of enumeration or data entry,
which in general was of high quality. The fact that the
informal sector has these two distinct components; a
large mass of smaller firms, alongside a few larger
ones is a result that deserves additional scrutiny, since
policy concerns and prescriptions differ significantly
for the two groups. Additional analysis that segregates
the two would likely find that poverty is a more serious
concern than the aggregated analysis revealed.
Characteristics of the informal sector
The survey enumeration succeeded in its goal of
interviewing primary earners (92 percent). These are
the individuals whose characteristics are most
relevant for studying compliance decisions and other
economic behavior. Across the self-employed groups
no great differences exist regarding gender, marital
status, family size, and age, though two-thirds of the
herders are male compared to 53 percent for the self-
employed in general. Viz. education, non-herder
informals in general have a higher level of education
than herders and the formal sector in turn has a higher
level of education than the non-herder informals.
The survey design was based on the insight from
other IRIS work that social and personal attitudes play
an important role in the type of economic decisions
that individuals make. As discussed in Section 6.2,
below these characteristics can help to adjust
responses for several biases as well as to help
combine sets of observations gathered from different
treatments. Hence the survey posed questions
covering a range of issues including patience, trust—
W
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including trust of government, trustworthiness,
fairness and honesty, and the willingness to take risks.
We find, in general, the herding sector has quite
different attitudes than those of the formal and informal
sector business owners, who are often similar to each
other.
In particular, we find formal sector owners the
least patient and trusting of all groups; herders
showed the highest level of trust. No significant
differences were found in trustworthiness. Only a
quarter of respondents indicated they regularly attend
religious establishments. Viz. self-assessed honesty
and a sense of fairness, herders and the unemployed
showed the highest levels, with self-employed
business owners the least. No big differences were
found in the latter between the formal and informal
sector. Regarding risk attitudes, the herders were
substantially more willing to take risks, a result all the
more surprising given their lower levels of income.
Finally, the views of respondents regarding trust in
and fairness of the government fall with formality of
the business, and this fall is associated with negative
experiences that increase with business formality.
We estimate that approximately 286,000
households had current self-employment income in
September 2004, distributed across the herding
sector (49 percent), the non-herding informal sector
(46 percent), and the formal sector (5 percent).
Regional variation of self-employment showed the non-
herder informal share to range from 19 percent in
the Eastern Region to 86 percent in Ulaanbaatar.
Location differences were also great. Self-employment
showed the non-herder informal share to range from
5 percent in the rural areas to 73 percent in soum
centers to 82 percent in aimag centers. (Note that
here we have been discussing the number of self-
employed households, whereas above, when
discussing measurement, we refer to the distribution
of value of self-employment activity.)
Turning to the composition of self-employment
by economic sector, we find the trade activity, which
includes wholesale, retail, and repairs, to contain 50
percent of the total of self-employment in both the
formal and informal sectors. However, within the trade
sector itself, 90 percent of self-employed households
are in the informal sector, compared to just 10 percent
for formal businesses. Following trade, the economic
sectors that involve the largest share of the informal
sector households are manufacturing (20 percent)
and transport, storage and communications (11
percent). Finally, formal self-employed firms, with 4.9
workers (including the owner), are on average more
than twice as large as the informal sector firms, which
average 2.3 workers.
Wage payments to household members are
rare across all business status, with wage employees
highest in the formal sector as expected. Unpaid
family workers are the predominant type of employee
in the non-herding informal sector. Employees work
considerably more and are better paid in the formal
sector.  Our estimate of the marginal product of labor,
the amount required to hire an additional worker for
one hour ranged from a negligible amount (47
togrogs) among the herders, to 387 togrogs among
non-herding informals, and 666 togrogs among the
formal sector businesses. Finally, formal and non-
herding informal sectors report breaks in business
activity of 2 to 3 months per year, while herders
report essentially constant activity.
Collective action in the private sector is often
abetted through business associations. Associational
activity is low in Mongolia, with more than 98 percent
reporting that they are uninvolved in business
associations.
Formal firms are more than twice as likely to
have written accounts (77 percent versus 36 percent).
In the large informal sectors written records are
scarce in manufacturing (20 percent), construction (9
percent), and transport, storage and communications
(11 percent). Regarding the location of the business
workplace, a slightly larger share of informal
businesses are home-based (36 percent versus 30
percent). Only 40 percent of non-herding informals
have stable non-home-based businesses locations; the
figure for the formal sector is 56 percent. With regards
to ownership type the formal and informal (non-
herding) sectors do not differ greatly with
approximately 60 percent reporting sole ownership
in both sectors.
Viz. sources of financing, two-thirds (for formal
small businesses) to seven-eights (herders) come
from own (or family) sources. The rest is spread out
among the other possible sources, with banks being
about as important as moneylenders or family friends.
Only about one-eighth of informal businesses have
ever borrowed, compared to one-third for formal small
businesses.
Finally, with regard to dispute resolution there
seems to be a consensus that the courts are viable,
with only 10 percent citing deficiencies associated with
capacity, corruption, or court costs as reasons for not
using the judicial system. A further 7 percent would
not use them because they are unsure of how to do
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so, but roughly 83 percent of the population
expressed a willingness to use this mechanism. These
results were similar across employment statuses.
There was a small decline in willingness to use the
courts among the group who has used them
previously, however the difference was not
statistically significant. Among this group however,
more raised concerns regarding the potential for
bribery to affect outcomes and for the general
unreliability of the system.
Causes and consequences
Due to the massive amount of information generated
by the survey, this report was barely able to scratch
the surface of the full implications for policy. We
return to this point in Section 6.2. What we can say is
that it appears that regulatory concerns and the
perception that there is a lack of serious consequences
for noncompliance are two factors associated with
many of the illicit behaviors that respondents
admitted. Formal businesses perceive sector-specific
regulations and the business registry process itself
as their largest obstacles. Informal workers are
concerned with sector-specific regulations, customs
regulations, and labor regulations. There are
differences across the formal and informal
employment statuses with regard to which sectors’
regulations are a concern. This suggests that
avoidance of formal sector regulation may be
motivating informal activity. The construction,
manufacturing, hotel/restaurants, and transportation
sectors have the largest differences in proportions
reporting regulatory obstacles across the formal and
informal statuses. In finance, mining, and agriculture,
the differences in perceived regulatory burdens are
relatively similar.
With regard to registration requirements, the
consensus is that noncompliance leads to minor
penalties, such as being forced to register. However
the likelihood of discovery is believed to be high and
this leads to compliance rates with the informal sector
law at a rate of roughly 60 percent.
Treatment Effects
In the discussion of survey results relating to corrupt
practices and tax evasion the  results reported above
have made use of responses derived from the two-
question method. As discussed in section 2 the two-
question method was the most secure question style
implemented for “yes-no” questions since both the
envelope and a scrambling device were used. Thus
the respondent’s anonymity was protected both
during and after the interview. In this section we
present descriptive statistics showing that, in general,
more sensitive information was revealed through the
use of the two-question method. In addition Table 6.1
reveals a number of other interesting and important
effects.
In Table 6.1 Treatment 1 is the direct-question
method. Treatments 2 and 4 use the envelope
technique, and Treatments 3 and 5 use the two-
question method. Treatment 2 and Treatment 4 differ
in that during the income and balance sheet section,
Treatment 2 used the envelope while Treatment 4
used the multiplier. Treatments 3 and Treatment 5
differ in the same way. In both cases the treatment
with the lower number used the less secure method
for the income and balance sheet questions. Our
results show that, while the effect is small, those who
received more security during the income and balance
sheet questions were consistently more willing to
reveal sensitive information in the latter part of the
survey. For example in Question 158 8.5 percent
admitted export related bribes in Treatment 2 while
11.5 percent did so in Treatment 4.
These differences suggest that not only is the
question style for a particular topic important, but that
the overall tone set by the survey with regard to
protecting the anonymity of respondents has an effect.
Efforts made earlier in the survey to reassure
respondents by using secure question styles had a
positive impact later in the survey even when the
question style did not differ. This effect is consistent
with results discussed earlier suggesting that
reassurances of confidentiality can be important in
generating truthful responses (Moore and Loomis
2001). While concern with the overall impression of
the survey should not be neglected, we see much
more dramatic effects within the sensitive question
section when comparing the envelope and two-
question methods directly. In Table 6.2 we combine
observations from (envelope) Treatments 2 and 4 and
(two-question) Treatments 3 and 5, and for
comparison also present the direct-question approach
(Treatment 1).
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Q158-Q163 were asked of self-employed.
Q164 was asked of full sample.
Q158 Have you paid customs officials?
Treatment Share answering “Yes” Number receiving the treatment
Treatment-1 0.1011905 168,0
Treatment-2 0.0853081 1,055
Treatment-3 0.1666525 1,253
Treatment-4 0.1153846 156
Treatment-5 0.1817627 4,848
Total 0.1624333 7,480
Q159 Have you smuggled goods into Mongolia?
Treatment Share answering “Yes” Number receiving the treatment
Treatment-1 0.1011905 168,0
Treatment-2 0.1090047 1,055
Treatment-3 0.1686605 1,253
Treatment-4 0.1217949 156
Treatment-5 0.1975703 4,848
Total 0.176491 7,480
Q160 Do you believe you are required to pay the Informal Sector tax?
Treatment Share answering “Yes” Number receiving the treatment
Treatment-1 0.6369048 168
Treatment-2 0.5905213 1,055
Treatment-3 0.6907012 1,251
Treatment-4 0.6474359 156
Treatment-5 0.6929926 4,847
Total 0.6759399 7,477
Q161 Did you pay the Informal Sector tax
Treatment Share answering “Yes” Number receiving the treatment
Treatment-1 0.5963303 109
Treatment-2 0.6305344 655
Treatment-3 0.5909976 898
Treatment-4 0.5471698 106
Treatment-5 0.561185 3,478
Total 0.5753941 5,246
TABLE 6.1 Treatment effects for sensitive questions
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Q162 Have you paid money to government officials?
Treatment Share answering “Yes” Number receiving the treatment
Treatment-1 0.1666667 168
Treatment-2 0.1488152 1,055
Treatment-3 0.2675456 1,251
Treatment-4 0.1730769 156
Treatment-5 0.2921428 4,848
Total 0.2625044 7,478
Q163 Have you presented gifts to government officials?
Treatment Share answering “Yes” Number receiving the treatment
Treatment-1 0.2678571 168
Treatment-2 0.2018957 1,055
Treatment-3 0.1268526 1,252
Treatment-4 0.2115385 156
Treatment-5 0.1934035 4,848
Total 0.1855114 7,479
Q164 Did you pay taxes in full amount required by law?
Treatment Share answering “Yes” Number receiving the treatment
Treatment-1 0.581749 263
Treatment-2 0.5993091 1,737
Treatment-3 0.5919496 2,048
Treatment-4 0.5402299 261
Treatment-5 0.5673019 7,855
Total 0.5757537 12,164
With one exception we see that the two-question
method is effective. With regard to admitting bribes
to customs officials in q158 double the number (18
percent versus 9 percent) admit this behavior when
provided the additional security of the two question
method. The result is similar with regard to smuggling
activity, 19 percent admit this behavior with the two-
question approach versus 11 percent with the
envelope method. These results are statistically
significant at a p-value less than 0.01. The direct
responses are not significantly different than those
derived from the envelope method.
The questions on the patente eligibility and
compliance also are more revealing due to the use of
the two-question method. The first question (q160)
was used to identify only those for whom it was
relevant to ask the patente compliance question. While
this was not deemed overly sensitive, there is a
significantly greater number admitting a need to
comply with the two-question method (69 percent
versus 60 percent). This suggests people may have
anticipated the follow-up question on compliance or
in general were less willing to address the patente
issue without the additional security. There is also a
relatively small difference in the compliance rates with
57-percent compliant under the two-question method
and 62-percent compliant under the envelope method.
As mentioned above, however, it appears a larger
number of the non-compliant did not answer this
question in the envelope treatment. Results with both
TABLE 6.1 continued
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TABLE 6.2 Treatment effects, pooling Treatments 2-4 and 3-5
Treatment mean(q158) Number
Direct 0.1011905 168
Envelop 0.0891825 1.211
Two-q 0.1786594 6.101
Total 0.1624333 7.480
Treatment mean(q158) Number
Direct 0.1011905 168
Envelop 0.1106523 1.211
Two-q 0.1916329 6.101
Total 0.176491 7.480
Treatment mean(q158) Number
Direct 0.6369048 168
Envelop 0.597853 1.211
Two-q 0.6925225 6.098
Total 0.6759399 7.477
Treatment mean(q158) Number
Direct 0.5963303 109
Envelop 0.6189225 761
Two-q 0.5673029 4.376
Total 0.5753942 5.246
Treatment mean(q158) Number
Direct 0.1666667 168
Envelop 0.1519405 1.211
Two-q 0.2870975 6.099
Total 0.2625044 7.478
Treatment mean(q158) Number
Direct 0.2678571 168
Envelop 0.2031379 1.211
Two-q 0.1797442 6.100
Total 0.1855114 7.479
Treatment mean(q158) Number
Direct 0.581749 263
Envelop 0.5915916 1.998
Two-q 0.5723991 9.903
Total 0.5757537 12.16
6.2 POTENTIAL REFINEMENTS TO INSTRUMENT
AND ANALYSIS
The analysis of the ISHS presented in the previous
sections does not provide a complete analysis of the
data collected in the survey and in this section we
discuss several areas where additional work could be
done to refine the analysis and glean more useful
results from the study. Some of these refinements
require the use of data external to the survey while
others simply apply additional concepts or techniques
to the ISHS data itself. Furthermore, during the
implementation and analysis of the ISHS it became
clear that some aspects of the implementation could
be improved if a similar survey were to be
implemented in the future. In this section we consider
both of these issues, identifying potential refinements
to the survey instrument, the analysis, as well as some
issues associated with the selection of the survey
sample.
Analytical refinements
Analytical refinements with regard to both shadow
economy measurement and policy implications are
possible and we believe could be informative. With
regard to the overall measurement of the informal
sector shadow economy we have reported design
based estimates that are based on survey weights
derived from the sampling plan. An alternative to the
design based approach that would serve to check the
robustness of the design-based estimates is to model
the size of the informal sector shadow
econometrically by making use of additional data from
outside of the ISHS. The most critical data for a model-
based estimation is the NSO’s data from the business
registry on the formal sector, and the Ministry of
Finance’s (MOF) data on the extent of patente
registry. In addition to providing a check on the design-
based measures, the model-based approaches, by
methodologies suggest patente compliance is an
important policy issue.
The results regarding bribery in general provide
a similar pattern of evidence as those regarding border
activity. Twenty-nine percent admit bribery with the
two-question technique as opposed to 15 percent with
the envelope and 17 percent with the direct
method—a value which does not differ, statistically,
from the envelope result. Following up the bribery
question is a less sensitive question regarding giving
non-monetary gifts. Interestingly, the results are
reversed for this question with the two-question
method revealing the least gift-giving (18 percent)
and the direct question the most (26 percent). It
seems that both monetary bribes and the gift-giving
are fairly widespread but, not surprisingly, people
substitute the less sensitive behavior for the more
sensitive one when asked directly. The final question
on tax-evasion does not show a statistically significant
difference across question types leading us to believe
that this question is not particularly sensitive.
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providing a link between ISHS data and data that is
available in all aimags and soums would allow us to
generate estimates of the size and sectoral distribution
of informal shadow activity in areas of the country
that were not surveyed in the ISHS.
Modeling approaches could be implemented
with varying degrees of comprehensiveness
depending on an assessment of priorities. For
example, a model that included formal sector
information from the business register could also be
supplemented by formal sector results from the ISHS.
Design-based estimates suggest that the ISHS picked
up households representing approximately 80
percent of the firms in the business registry. Better
modeling of the informal sector could be obtained by
examining the relationship between these two
sources of formal sector data.
Refinements of the model based measurements
presented earlier in this volume are also possible. One
area in which the survey measures could be improved
is in assessing the regional distribution of the informal
sector shadow size. Budget limitations required that
a limited number of aimags be sampled in each region.
This restriction made it difficult to fully measure the
variability from north to south in each region. As a
result the regional measures in activity may be biased.
The survey as a whole, however, did contain a
reasonable distribution of aimags in the north and
south. We therefore can use “post-stratification”
techniques that infer regional activity by using results
from other regions, to improve estimates of the
regional distribution of activity. Further work on the
precision of the estimates is also warranted. There
are a number of avenues to consider here. First the
non-normality of the dataset implies that a small
number of firms have a large impact on the overall
shadow size and estimates of its variance. This arises
from the small number of firms that have very high
incomes leading to a long tail on the upper end of the
annualized value added distribution. We believe it is
incorrect to remove these observations. Additional
insights into the causes and consequences of shadow
activity, as well as interesting measurement results
could be attained by analyzing the upper tail and the
90 percent of the observations that make up the
“body” of the survey responses independently.
The distribution of activity across economic
sectors could also be addressed with model-based
analytical approaches. As discussed with regards to
the design-based measurement results, the size of
several sectors differed from expectations. While the
design-based measures provide an unbiased estimate
of sector size due to the random selection of
households, it is possible that areas rich in activity in
a specific sector are missed. A model based approach
would allow inferences regarding the size of sectors
to be made in areas that were not part of the ISHS
sample.
Another set of ways to improve the current
estimates that remains to be implemented is to take
advantage of the two survey sections containing
respondent and enumerator feedback information,
which was explicitly designed for this purpose. These
questions contain information regarding the
seriousness and conscientiousness of the respondent,
an assessment of her understanding of the questions
(and games) asked, and the enumerator’s assessment
of the respondent’s relative standard of living. This
information can be used to weigh certain observations
more than others in the econometric estimation
procedures as well as to conduct verification and even
adjustment of the responses themselves.
In addition to using the formal sector data in the
ISHS for modeling as discussed above, the formal
sector data may be used to generate a rough estimate
of the formal sector shadow contribution from these
smaller formal sector businesses. Since we believe
that the shadow economy may contain a substantial
formal component, this extension may provide initial
estimates that though provisional, due to the auxiliary
assumptions needed to make such an estimate, may
be a useful start. At the least, the results may be
informative regarding the types of resources it would
be worthwhile expending on investigating formal
sector activity.
Another aspect of the ISHS analysis that
could bear further development is the linking of
characteristics to behaviors. While the tabulations
generated for the discussion in Section 5 provide
insight into how those with different employment
statuses differ, a further analysis that examines
participation by status conditional on characteristics
would have more power to reveal causal links.
Moreover, using attitudes and characteristics data
would allow the pooling of responses from the various
treatments, thereby effectively increasing sample size
and thus narrowing confidence bands.
Survey refinement
The survey was implemented in five versions, or
treatments, and one of the surprising results was the
significantly lower estimates both with regard to value
added and household income, that were revealed by
84 THE SIZE AND CHARACTER OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR AND
 ITS SHADOW ECONOMY IN MONGOLIA
6 CHAPTER WHAT WAS LEARNED
the multiplier treatment. While we continue to believe
that this method is appropriate for protecting
individuals’ anonymity, the large differences between
this protocol and the envelope method in rural areas
suggests that this protocol should not be used in its
present form in these areas. We do think that the
multiplier method could be modified slightly to
address a question that was not included in the current
implementation of the ISHS. Although we asked about
participation in corrupt activities, we did not attempt
to gather more specific information on their value.
We believe that a variant of the multiplier method,
which was sensitive to the fact that any non-zero
amount was revealing sensitive information, could be
developed for future survey work so that values of
bribes paid could be estimated.
We suggest that two options be considered
before using the income and balance sheet again.
First, it would be useful to provide additional options
when asking individuals to provide estimates of
seasonal variability of their income. This would
smooth calculations for seasonal adjustments,
although econometric methods could also be used to
achieve this objective. In addition it would be useful, if
several treatments are implemented, to implement
one that provided detailed information on the
components of value added rather than the summed
aggregates which were collected in the ISHS. While
the aggregation was intended to provide the
respondents with additional security, some
information is lost with this procedure, and additional
policy implications could be drawn with knowledge of
the details of the income and balance sheet.
Further thought needs to be given, as well, to
the operational transformation of the survey if it is
used to provide updated measures of the size of the
informal sector shadow economy in years to come.
An alternative to the mixed household-enterprise
survey that was considered for the current project
was the attachment of the survey to an ongoing NSO
data collection effort, with the Household Income and
Expenditure Survey (HHIES) the best candidate for
this approach. While it was decided that the
independent mixed survey was more appropriate for
meeting the current goals, updates created by
attaching the income and balance sheet component
of the ISHS, and other selected sections to the HHIES
may be feasible.  One issue to address in any future
implementation is to consider whether a fuller
enumeration of self-employment activity for each
household member should be attempted. Given the
relatively greater time taken to complete the HHIES
as compared with the ISHS this might be feasible and
would give a better understanding of additional,
though smaller self-employment activities in the
household.
Other issues associated with specific questions
also arose. Question 111 on current income, inserted
as a check on the balance sheet results, proved to be
important for estimating value added due to the large
number firms reporting current losses. Question 111
itself could be modified to more exactly mirror the
income derived from the income and balance sheet
by asking the respondent to report other income
streams. The income and balance sheet should be
adjusted to accommodate losses both in original
recording of results and in extrapolation of the
seasonal adjustments.
We think there are two important ways that
additional useful information could be extracted from
the ISHS project with a view toward improving future
implementations. A first step would involve
conducting an analysis on how survey costs and the
sampling plan interacted so that an optimal design
can be constructed for future efforts. While estimates
of travel costs and other survey costs were well
understood, the distribution of the sample made use
of very limited information on the variability of the
underlying values that were to be measured. The
knowledge of the variability of these figures can now
be used to fine tune the sampling plan for cost
effectiveness.
A final issue to consider is whether the overall
framework, which made use of a variant of the mixed
household-enterprise survey, could be improved
upon. One survey structure that was considered but
not implemented was a mixed household-enterprise
survey with two-stage sampling. Two-stage sampling
involves an initial set of brief interviews from a random
sample of the household frame to determine if
individuals are of interest for the informal sector
survey. This initial interview should be done in a
relatively unclustered fashion, perhaps by making use
of local NSO staff. The results of the first stage would
then be used to stratify the sample for the final survey.
The critical advantage of this method is that
stratification could be done by sector, insuring
appropriate representation of all sectors in the survey.
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This note outlines two approaches to providing
protection to survey respondents who are asked to
reveal sensitive information about their economic
activity. Randomized response methods provide
protection by introducing noise into the data collection
process so that it is impossible for the interviewer or
the final users of the data to know how any specific
individual has responded to a sensitive question,
allaying fears of exposure. The methods provide
population data, however, on the subjects of interest.
Because the randomized response yields
aggregate values without linking responses directly
to individuals it often outperforms direct questions
for measurement of population values. Randomized
response approaches are less useful however for
some policy analyses, such as those making use of
regressions in which individual characteristics and
individual behavior must be linked. As a result we
expect that it will be necessary to use both randomized
response and direct question methods in order to get
the most informative data from the shadow economy
survey.
Randomized response methods have been used
in a variety of contexts in both developing and
developed countries beginning in the mid 1960’s after
the groundbreaking work of Warner (1965). Most
early implementations of randomized response
techniques investigated sensitive issues such as drug
and alcohol use and sexual behavior. Applications with
more direct economic content have become more
prevalent. Chaudhuri (1983) investigated input use
in a large agricultural survey using randomized
response methods as a preliminary step to estimating
production functions for crop agriculture in India. More
recently randomized response techniques have been
used to study tax evasion (Houston and Tran 2001)
and the size of the unobserved economy in Turkey
(Savasan 2003).
A large number of randomized response
techniques have been developed and the literature
suggests that the suitability of a method to specific
problem and to a specific location deserves careful
Appendix 1: Statistical properties
of randomized response
study.  In general there are clear advantages to
randomized response methods both for reducing non-
response rates and for getting respondents to reveal
sensitive information. Two types of randomized
response techniques are proposed for the shadow
economy survey, one for dichotomous, yes/no
questions, and one for questions with numeric
responses. For dichotomous responses we
implement a technique we call the two–question
method. For numeric responses the technique will
be called the multiplier method.
The two-question method presents two
unrelated questions, one which is sensitive such as
“Did you cheat on your taxes this year?” and a
harmless question that people should not have a
problem answering such as “Do you like basketball?”
The outcome of a randomizing device, such as a die
roll or coin flip, is observed only by the respondent. In
the discussion that follows we assume that the
sensitive and harmless questions are each asked with
a 50% probability.
Let lˆ be the observed proportion responding
“yes” to the two-question method question. The
proportion of interest is Sp , the proportion
responding “yes” to the sensitive question. To find
Sp , the observed response can be decomposed such
that HS PP ppl )1(*ˆ -+=  where P =.5 is the
probability determined by design, and Hp  is the
proportion responding “yes” to the harmless question.
An estimate of the proportion with the sensitive
characteristic is therefore given by
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H
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P
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.
Since P is chosen by design and lˆ  is observed in the
data, we need only to have an estimate of  to estimate
the proportion with the sensitive attribute. The
proportion  is determined by splitting the respondent
sample and asking another group who does not receive
the two-question question to answer the harmless
questions. Note that if  is too large it is possible to
infer that , a nonsensical result. Care must be taken in
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the design and through pre-testing to avoid this result.
The probability of being asked the sensitive
question, P, has an important impact on the level of
protection that the method provides because it
represents the amount of noise introduced. The
variance of the proportion of interest in the two
question method is approximated by var ( ) ( )2
ˆvar
PS
l
p = .
The multiplier method generates estimates for
numeric data such as income or value added by asking
individuals to multiply their truthful response to a
question and multiply it by the roll of a die that only
they observe.  To generate different amounts of
confidentiality die of different sizes can be used.  Let
z be the observed response to the question. The
parameter in the population is given by XYZ = ,
where X  is the value of interest and Y  is the scrambling
component that results from the die roll36.  An
unbiased estimate of the parameter of interest is
denoted xmˆ , with 
y
x
z
m
m =ˆ . Here 
n
z
z
n
i
iå
== 1  and
ym  depends on the choice of scrambling device. A
four-sided die for instance would yield
 5.2
4
4321
14 =
+++
=ym . The variance of the
 estimate is given by var  ( ) 2
14
2
y
z
x nm
s
m = .
36 Additive approaches, with Z=X+Y, may also prove useful. These will provide protection when a response of zero may be revealing. The
additive method poses some additional difficulties however since information on the magnitude of X is needed to insure that the
distribution of Y provides protection for the respondent.
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